Introduction

The contemporary international system has been defined by American exceptionalism and intervention. The era of so-called Pax Americana reveals the prevalence and usefulness of empire as a concept in the modern era. Contemporary empires look different from those of antiquity; the Romans did not have to contend with global communication networks, and the Incas did not reign over landscapes under significant ecological pressure. However, the inherent difference between traditional conceptions of empire and what they may look like today does not imply that the term is outdated or irrelevant. As Julian Go states in the introduction of his book, Patterns of Empire: The British and American Empires, 1688 to Present: “definitions cannot be wrong or right. They can only be useful or not.”[i] The term empire is particularly useful in understanding the basis of the modern international system and the unique security components that define it. It offers explanations of three significant components of global security: the US-led liberal international order, development and non-traditional security proliferation, and the rise of China as a global power.

To begin with, US unipolarity after the Cold War mirrors imperial structures in world history, and can be used to better understand the US-led international order and American foreign security policies.

Secondly, empire can help explain trends in global development trajectories and the related proliferation of non-traditional security threats. Decolonization and the systemic drawdown of former European empires, a defining trend of the 20th century, can be used to explain the systemic development struggles of the ‘global south.’ The developing world has faced exploitation and hypocrisy from the broader international community and has, as a result, suffered from a myriad of challenges, including food insecurity, irregular warfare, and climate change.

Finally, empire can be used to explain current shifts in the balance of international power, as China rises to equal the United States. An application of the concept and Julian Go’s patterns of empire theory indicates that this structural shift is more inevitable than uncertain.

However, understandings of empire are complex and not universally applicable. There are aspects of the contemporary international security order that are not adequately explained by the application of empire, such as the increasingly important role of multi- and mini-lateral institutions. The incongruence of periphery-led organisations such as the Pacific Islands Forum challenges the usefulness of empire as a contemporary concept.

Understanding Empire

Before empire can be applied to the structure of the international security environment, the term itself must be defined.

In Patterns of Empire, Go understands empire as a “sociopolitical formation wherein a central political authority exercises unequal influence and power over the political processes of a subordinate society, peoples or space.”[ii] He clarifies that empire extends beyond economic dependence and entails a multi-faceted sociopolitical relationship between a central power and a periphery.[iii]

Jan Zielonka’s understanding of empire in Empire and the Modern International System adds value by comparing empire to parallel notions of hegemony, great power, and state. Zielonka claims that the study of empire is more useful than a state-centred lens, as it better encapsulates “economic interdependence, transnational jurisdictions and multiple cultural loyalties of the contemporary global environment.”[iv] In his view, empire accounts for  “fuzzy borders, informal hierarchies, and centre-periphery dependencies”, while demanding a focus on the scope and structure of governance, the nature of borders, and civilising missions.[v] Informal forms of empire are far more prevalent in the contemporary international system; states often use political power to assert dominance over subordinate states to maximise their strategic security interests.

The focus on the global security order must also be understood before empire can become a useful lens. International security has emerged out of international relations as a field of study, focused on “international violence and threats to the security of states.”[vi] The contemporary international system has been defined by the proliferation of new transnational threats to international security as technologies develop, different states undergo uneven developmental trajectories, hegemons rise and fall, and the global environment changes.[vii] Applying the concept of empire is useful for providing clarity to the formation and function of the global security order and the construction of threats, challenges, and solutions.

The Operation of the US-led International Order

The international system has been dominated by the United States since the end of the Cold War, which saw the disintegration of the USSR and the beginning of US-led unipolarity. In terms of international security, no state is capable of matching the military might of the US, even as China modernises its force and newly nuclear-capable states rapidly proliferate.[viii] The US has over 700 bases or military installations spread across 130 countries.[ix] However, the reach of the US force alone doesn’t warrant their labelling as an empire. If we use the term empire to attempt to understand America’s global military dominance, we must include consideration of political influence as well. One way of doing so is to consider the US extended nuclear deterrence guarantee, through which the US influences smaller, subordinate states.

Extended nuclear deterrence is a concept that emerged as a result of the proliferation of nuclear weapons.[x] In an effort to curb the number of states proliferating and developing nuclear weapons capabilities, the US extended an offer of deterrence to a number of allies, including the NATO states, Australia, Japan, and South Korea, to remove the need for the creation of sovereign programmes.[xi] In practice, this meant the US promised nuclear-powered protection in exchange for dominance over the potential and actual arsenals of its allies. As a policy compelling allies to trade American security guarantees for political and strategic autonomy, extended nuclear deterrence is a bastion of the American empire. As an analytical concept, empire points us to the interchanges and structures of power that constitute the international order.

Go clarifies distinct types of empire in his work, differentiating between informal and formal empire. The difference between the two emerges in the methods used to assert political influence over the subordinate state and its people.[xii] Informal empire relies on methods that fall short of military subjugation and annexation, but that render the subordinate state an effective weak ally, client, or dependent on the central state.[xiii] In the contemporary security order, this appears as the “offer” of protection, money, or access to resources that small, developing, or weaker states are unable to refuse. The idea of it being an “offer” is inaccurate. Often the dominant central power will assert influence over areas that a smaller state is unable to provide or fulfil independently, increasing their reliance on the metropole.

Nowhere is this more obvious than the security relationship between Australia and the US. Though security cooperation has long been a part of the US-Australia ‘alliance’, Australia’s limited sovereign defence capability is the framework for a fundamentally unequal relationship that sees Australia almost entirely reliant on US joint operations and development expertise.[xiv] During the advent of nuclear weapons, Australia was among many states that considered developing a sovereign nuclear programme. Given the role several Australians played in the development of the bomb at Los Alamos, an indigenous knowledge base had already been established.[xv] Further, uranium was easily accessible, and there was plenty of unoccupied space available for development and testing.[xvi] However, the Americans’ desire to restrict the number of states with nuclear capability as much as possible led to the encouragement of its allies away from proliferation beyond civilian applications. Australian Cold War leaders eventually conceded in favour of the US.[xvii]

Though Washington has never contradicted Australian claims of protection under the so-called US nuclear umbrella, there has also never been an explicit statement of commitment to such a guarantee by the US.[xviii] Therefore, Australia is not only reliant on US deterrence against a nuclear attack from other adversaries, but deterrence is based on a loose understanding and aligning of interests, rather than an explicit guarantee of protection. Ambiguity reinforces Australia’s informal dependency on American military prowess, obliging Australian leaders to constantly signal commitment to protecting American interests.

Non-Traditional Security and Empire

Unequal development trajectories between countries characterise the contemporary international system, and are a direct consequence of imperial powers and the colonisation of states in the Global South.[xix] Global inequalities have implications for the global security order. The proliferation of irregular warfare, non-state actor violence, and the rise of non-traditional security threats can be examined alongside development struggles among former colonial states.

Non-state actor violence and irregular warfare are intrinsically linked concepts that have changed the focus of international security. The proliferation of intrastate conflicts has emerged from poor development and state governance, which are often directly linked to decolonisation and the lack of adequate policy frameworks and infrastructure systems put in place to ensure transitions to independence were stable. In a closer examination of the Pacific Island states, the frequent outbreak of conflict can be tied to ethnic grievances and resource mismanagement, themselves hallmarks of a colonial legacy.[xx]

In Bougainville (a separatist region in Papua New Guinea) and the Solomon Islands, ineffective governance of mineral resources led to internal grievances based on the disproportionate distribution of royalties between landowning-elites and the local population. However, the independent governments of Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands had little ability to diversify the state economy away from extractive resources, as imperial powers (including the British, German, and Australian-led administrations) had over-invested in the mining industry, in order to exploit the natural resources of their colonies.[xxi] The widespread consequences of unfavourable interactions between customary power structures and Western development priorities in the Pacific Islands and other former colonies saw the rise of non-state actor violence and civilian insurgency,[xxii] which is perceived as the only effective method of forcing changes to the government.

Food and human security are also increasingly prevalent security threats in the global security order. Often food insecurity and human security issues (such as forced displacement) emerge as a result of civil conflict and have wide-reaching impacts beyond the states that are the primary actors in a conflict.[xxiii] Forced displacement puts immense pressure on the domestic state responsible to support and shelter refugees, as well as the  neighbouring states that receive large flows of people. The theory of intervention or the ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P) doctrine can force states that are not involved in conflicts to bear the responsibility for the consequences of the conflict on the civilian population.[xxiv] R2P and liberal interventionism can also be understood through the lens of empire. They are decidedly liberal policies that align strongly with US values of democracy and interventionism, and promote burden-sharing. When systems of democracy are imposed on states experiencing instability, it undoubtedly strengthens the US liberal order, and ensures subordinate states assist Americans in propagating these values. As such, interventions into unstable states, and the collective management of related security concerns, can be perceived as imperial civilising missions, rather than merely peacekeeping operations.[xxv]

Furthermore, ethnic tensions that escalate into substate conflict often have roots in systems of imperial subjugation. For example, in Sri Lanka, the Tamil population were largely favoured by the British imperial administration in terms of education, employment, and representation in the civil service.[xxvi] This ignited grievances in other ethnic groups in Sri Lanka. Once independence was achieved, the newly established and primarily non-Tamil government began implementing policies that systemically oppressed the Tamil population. These policies concerned language and education, and restricted the Tamil to specific areas of the country.[xxvii] The ensuing violence of the Sri Lankan civil war between the Tamil ethnic group and the Sri Lankan government lasted twenty-five years, and can be understood as a direct result of colonial structures, and the misunderstanding of customary hierarchies that proliferated grievances in the civilian population.

The Inevitable Rise of China

Julian Go uses a comparative analysis between the United States and Britain to explore the perceived exceptionalism of the American empire.[xxviii] His understanding centres on the so-called “patterns of empire,” which describes  the cyclical rise and fall of imperial powers over time in relation to their economic hegemony.[xxix] China’s undeniable rise in the international system to a global power capable of matching the United States can be understood by applying Julian Go’s patterns of empire theory.

China’s rise is an important component of the modern international system because of the implications it has for the very structure of the global order.[xxx] For decades, the international system has been dominated by the United States. A major element of this has been the sheer scale of US military power, and the inability of any other actor to realistically challenge it. However, since China’s industrialisation and development, the first significant challenge to US power has emerged.

It is important to note that the understanding of an empire must extend beyond purely economic dimensions. To simplify empire to refer only to global economic dominance misses the role of political influence and instead refers to hegemony.[xxxi] However, economic power is a key element of informal empire, and aids in explaining China’s inevitable rise. China has harnessed its growing economic power to influence the developing world and create a sphere of influence amongst states that are increasingly reliant on Chinese development investment and aid.[xxxii] The Belt and Road Initiative is an example of China’s use of an informal tool of empire; states that receive it often become ‘debt-trapped’ to China and are coerced into aligning themselves in support of China’s strategic and political interests on the international stage, such as over human rights issues.[xxxiii] This also serves to grant China access to strategic regions across the globe. For example, China’s increasing influence with Pacific Island states is in direct opposition to US attempts (and Australian attempts by extension) to maintain the role of primary development and security partner. [xxxiv]

Julian Go identifies the pattern of hegemonic decline of empires in his comparative analysis of the United States and the British Empire. He identifies that both empires experienced new economic competition from rivals that they had not experienced during the periods of imperial strength.[xxxv] This shaped the world into a newly multipolar competitive environment, with spheres of influence, or peripheries, coming under increasing competition. As China rises to pose a legitimate threat to the United States, we are once again seeing a pattern of hegemonic decline identified by Go in Patterns of Empire, and are likely to see the global order shift along new lines of geopolitical competition as a result.

Challenges to Empire and the International Security Order

Empire is a complex term that can be understood in several ways. While many of these understandings are useful in explaining important components of the modern security landscape, there are some elements that cannot be explained by empire. The increasing role of multilateral institutions in international security operates in opposition to empire, which would explain the rise of US-led iterations but struggles with periphery-led forums such as the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF). International institutions such as the PIF were created to encourage cooperation on issues central to peripheral states, and though larger powers are often part of them, the core operations and principles are decided by the periphery. This operates counter to theories of empire, which would expect the great powers that take the role of the metropole and remain protagonists in global decision-making.

The Pacific Islands Forum consists of eighteen member states, of which the only “Western” states are Australia and New Zealand – undeniable middle powers in the international system.[xxxvi] The first iteration of the PIF was created in 1971 after the ‘Lae Rebellion’, during which the head of Fiji’s colonial administration Ratu Mara demanded the Pacific Island states had more say about their own governance.[xxxvii] The predecessor to the PIF was the South Pacific Commission, which was established by the six colonial powers with administrative responsibilities in the region: Australia, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The Commission was purely for development matters, with nothing of a political nature (such as French nuclear testing) to be discussed.[xxxviii] The Forum has five main goals, all related to increasing regional cooperation on shared issues, primarily focused on sustainable development.[xxxix] The security aspect of the Forum, however, has been largely focused on ending reliance on foreign powers for security and developing and maintaining stability within the region. This desire for indigenous security capability will see the eventual decline of influence of powers such as Australia, the US, and China to whom the Pacific plays an important strategic role in the increasingly competitive security environment. Australia especially approaches the Pacific primarily through the role it plays in advancing national security.[xl] The removal of access to and manipulation of the Pacific acts against the will and security interests of the so-called metropole powers, which theories of empire would not expect.

The international security environment is complex and increasingly interdependent. As a result, theories of empire are not easily applied to every aspect of the global security order. Beyond consideration of regional alliances and cooperative institutions, traditional theories of empire also struggle to understand rising, but still developing, states such as India or the BRICS states, and the role that they are beginning to play on the world stage. As a concept born from inherently Western or Eurocentric dominance over the Global South, empire struggles to account for the growing influence and power of India, a future great power without a network of periphery states.

Conclusion

The global security order is constantly evolving, created by the interactions of different states and their interests on an international scale. In the post-Cold War era, the US-led liberal international order has defined how global security operates. In more recent years, China’s rise has begun to pose a realistic challenge to US hegemony. Theories of empire are useful in explaining this shift and the complexities of the international security system.

The American policy of extended nuclear deterrence acts as an informal method of asserting imperial dominance, forcing peripheral states like Australia to rely on the US and its vastly superior defence capability for protection from security threats. Empire can also be used to explain the uneven development of the Global South as a direct result from colonial exploitation. This lack of consistent stability and development in states such as the Pacific has led to the mismanagement of resources and a lack of consistent governance that has seen the rise of non-traditional security threats.

The non-traditional security challenges faced by the post-colonial developing world, which consist of threats such as climate change, food and water insecurity, and non-state violence, have become increasingly prevalent in the global security order, forcing new responses to effectively combat them. The concept of empire is useful in assessing the root causes of such issues, and how they impact developing states. In addition, the rise of China to threaten US supremacy in the international system can also be explained by the concept. Go’s patterns of empire theory acknowledges the stages of empire, including the inevitable decline. The US is undoubtedly in decline, primarily through loss of credibility and economic power, which China has taken advantage of to increase its own global influence and engage in strategic competition with America.

However, the term empire is broad and cannot easily explain every component of the global security order. Empire cannot explain the growing role of multilateral institutions in defining regional security interests. The Pacific Island Forum is a demonstration of regional cooperation to advance independent security capabilities and decrease the long-standing reliance on foreign intervention to maintain stability in the region. However, understanding the international security order through applying the term empire adds great value by explaining the roots of the contemporary international system, including the dominant US-order, the development challenges of the Global South, and the rise of China.

Endnotes

[i] Julian Go, “Introduction,” in Patterns of Empire: The British and American Empires, 1688 to the Present (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 6.

[ii] Ibid, p. 7

[iii] Ibid.

[iv] Jan Zielonka, “Empires and the Modern International System,” Geopolitics 17, no. 3 (July 2012): 502–25, p. 506 https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2011.595440.

[v] Ibid, p.  p. 506

[vi] Sean M. Lynn-Jones, “International Security Studies,” International Studies Notes 16/17, no. 3/1 (1991): 53–63 p. 53.

[vii] Ibid, p. 53

[viii] Zielonka, “Empires and the Modern International System.” p. 510

[ix] Ibid.

[x] Rod Lyon, “Extended Nuclear Deterrence and Assurance,” Nuclear Strategy in a Changing World (Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2019), https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep23099.6.

[xi] Ibid.

[xii] Go, “Introduction.” p. 9

[xiii] Ibid.

[xiv] Department of Defence, “National Defence – Defence Strategic Review 2023” (Canberra: Australian Government, 2023).

[xv] Jim Walsh, “Surprise Down Under: The Secret History of Australia’s Nuclear Ambitions,” The Nonproliferation Review 5, no. 1 (1997): 1–20, https://doi.org/10.1080/10736709708436690.

[xvi] Jeffrey S. Landis and Jeffrey S. Lantis, “Elections and Enduring Realities: Australia’s Nuclear Debate,” Arms Control Today 38, no. 3 (2008): 22–29.

[xvii] Landis and Lantis.

[xviii] Rod Lyon, “Australia and the US Nuclear Umbrella,” Nuclear Strategy in a Changing World (Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2019), https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep23099.7.

[xix] Sinclair Dinnen and Matthew Allen, “State Absence and State Formation in Solomon Islands: Reflections on Agency, Scale and Hybridity,” Development and Change 47, no. 1 (2016): 76–97, https://doi.org/10.1111/dech.12212.

[xx] Morgan Brigg and Roland Bleiker, “Postcolonial Conflict Resolution,” in Mediating Across Difference, ed. Morgan Brigg and Roland Bleiker, Oceanic and Asian Approaches to Conflict Resolution (University of Hawai’i Press, 2011), 19–37, https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt6wqfzw.5.

[xxi] Siri Aas Rustad, Paivi Lujala, and Philippe Le Billon, “Building or Spoiling Peace? Lessons from the Management of the High-Value Natural Resources,” in High-Value Natural Resources and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding (Abingdon: Earthscan, 2012), 571–621.

[xxii] Matthew G. Allen, Greed and Grievance: Ex-Militants’ Perspectives on the Conflict in Solomon Islands, 1998-2003, 1st ed., Topics in the Contemporary Pacific (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2013), https://doi.org/10.1515/9780824839222.

[xxiii] Ibid.

[xxiv] Gareth Evans, Ramesh Thakur, and Robert A. Pape, “Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect,” International Security 37, no. 4 (2013): 199–214.

[xxv] Zielonka, “Empires and the Modern International System.”

[xxvi] Bina D’Costa, “Sri Lanka: The End of War and the Continuation of Struggle,” in Diminishing Conflicts in Asia and the Pacific: Why Some Subside and Others Don’t, ed. E. Aspinall, R. Jeffrey, and A. Regan (Routledge, 2010), 101–14.

[xxvii] Ibid, p. 103

[xxviii] Go, “Introduction.”

[xxix] Ibid, p. 8

[xxx] Barry Buzan, “China in International Society: Is ‘Peaceful Rise’ Possible?,” The Chinese Journal of International Politics 3, no. 1 (2010): 5–36.

[xxxi] Zielonka, “Empires and the Modern International System.”

[xxxii] Steven Brakman et al., “The New Silk Roads: An Introduction to China’s Belt and Road Initiative,” Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society 12, no. 1 (February 20, 2019): 3–16, https://doi.org/10.1093/cjres/rsy037.

[xxxiii] James McBride, Noah Berman, and Andrew Chatzky, “China’s Massive Belt and Road Initiative,” Council on Foreign Relations, February 2, 2023, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative.

[xxxiv] Mihai Sora, “Australia Needs to Find the Right Role in the Pacific,” The Lowy Institute, May 2, 2022, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/australia-needs-find-right-role-pacific.

[xxxv] Go, “Introduction.”

[xxxvi] Nicola Baker, “New Zealand and Australia in Pacific Regionalism,” in The New Pacific Diplomacy, ed. Greg Fry and Sandra Tarte (ANU Press, 2015), 137–48, https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt19w71mc.18.

[xxxvii] Greg Fry, “The Decolonisation of Regional Governance,” in Framing the Islands, Power and Diplomatic Agency in Pacific Regionalism (ANU Press, 2019), 101–24, https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctvt6rjbw.11.

[xxxviii] Dave Peebles, “The Pacific Islands Forum,” in Pacific Regional Order (ANU Press, 2005), 58–80, https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt2jbk4c.11.

[xxxix] Ibid, p.62

[xl] Collin Beck, “Geopolitics of the Pacific Islands: How Should the Pacific Islands States Advance Their Strategic and Security Interests?,” Security Challenges 16, no. 1 (2020): 11–16.

Bibliography

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Freya Sander
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Freya is currently studying an MA of Conflict, Security, and Development at the King’s College London Department of War Studies. Her interest area centres around non-traditional security, power structures, and what empire looks like in the modern world, as well as the role of languages in international security.

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Freya Sander

Freya is currently studying an MA of Conflict, Security, and Development at the King’s College London Department of War Studies. Her interest area centres around non-traditional security, power structures, and what empire looks like in the modern world, as well as the role of languages in international security.