Source: Kristiina Klaas via Unsplash

 In the era of misinformation and fake news, there is a systematic attempt to dehumanise and delegitimise forcibly displaced people, portraying them as imminent threats rather than as victims fleeing from persecution, conflict or environmental crises. The relevance and significance of forced migration and displacement as a ‘weapon’ is simply undeniable, as historical and contemporary examples illustrate that both state and non-state actors have manipulated population movements to achieve various objectives, either political, military and/or economic (Greenhill, 2008). Simultaneously, political rhetoric often misrepresents or exaggerates the phenomenon by framing migration as a single security danger to justify restrictive policies (Burtin, 2024; Greenhill, 2022). Therefore, a thorough investigation of this subject is required to gain a comprehensive understanding of mass forced displacement, its legal and moral implications, and real-world consequences for government and international relations. 

This essay argues that while migration is strategically manipulated, the weaponisation narrative is frequently exaggerated and exploited to justify rights-restricting policies. It will assess this argument through legal, moral and political lenses; examining how international law constrains state responses, highlighting the ethical failures of dehumanising rhetoric. Additionally, policy examples, such as the Belarus-European Union (EU) border crisis and the United Kingdom (UK)–Rwanda scheme, will be evaluated to demonstrate how political framing, rather than actual threats, drives contemporary migration governance. 

Strategic Displacement: A Framework for Understanding Migration as a Political Tool

Scholarly debates on the strategic use of migration contend that the deliberate manipulation of population movements has a long-standing presence in the international political sphere. According to Greenhill (2022), the term ‘weaponisation of migration’ describes a situation where migration flows are deliberately manipulated by state or non-state actors to achieve strategic goals. This can involve actors intentionally creating, impeding, or manipulating population inflows or outflows, or even threatening to do so, to reach strategic aims, regardless of the specific objectives. Greenhill (2008) further explores four distinct, yet non-mutually exclusive, forms of migration that can be distinguished by their individual objectives. 

Firstly, Exportive Engineered Migration uses displacement to directly influence and destabilise foreign and domestic political structures. This is often carried out through the expulsion of ‘enemies’ or ‘dissidents’, ranging from individuals to entire groups or social classes (Greenhill, 2008, p. 9). Exportive migration is also utilised against foreign governments with the intent to undermine them or politically destabilise the state, as seen during the Belarus-EU border crisis, where Belarus’s president Lukashenko threatened to ‘flood’ the EU with migrants, resulting in an influx of migrants to the EU border (Burtin, 2024; Evans, 2021). The Belarus crisis demonstrates the deliberate use of displacement to destabilise neighbouring states by manufacturing a crisis on their borders. 

Secondly, Dispossessive Engineered Migration seeks either to seize the territory or property of the displaced, or to eliminate them as a threat to the perpetrators’ dominance (Greenhill, 2008, p. 8).  Today, this is widely recognised as ethnic cleansing, a concept that became a ‘household word’ during the Balkan wars of the 1990s (Burtin, 2024; Greenhill, 2008). These conflicts illustrate that while dispossessive migration is the most commonly recognised variant, such incidents are frequently driven by broader political and military goals, specifically the elimination of groups perceived as threats to a perpetrator’s dominance rather than for territorial acquisition. This demonstrates that weaponised migration is used to fundamentally and forcibly alter the ethno-religious-political balance within a territory, triggering deep and violent instability. 

Thirdly, Militarised Engineered Migration focuses on the use of displaced populations as a tactical instrument to achieve battlefield advantages during active conflict, linking displacement directly to war and security policy. These displacements are conducted to gain military advantage against an adversary, specifically through the disruption or destruction of an opponent’s command and control, logistics or movement capabilities (Greenhill, 2008, pp. 9-10). It can also be used to enhance one’s own force structure, as seen with the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, where the Soviets provoked refugee flows into Iran and Pakistan to deprive the guerrillas of bases of support (Greenhill, 2008, p. 9).  This demonstrates how population movements are engineered as instruments of war to deny opposing powers any support. 

Lastly, Coercive Engineered Migration refers to when population movements are created, impeded, or manipulated to extract concessions (mainly political, military, or economic) from target states. It bears similarities to traditional forms of coercion, functioning by raising the costs or risks to a target’s civilian populations (Greenhill, 2008, pp. 10-11). However, this variant is unique in that it is not confined to the typical pattern of strong actors targeting each other, or weaker actors. Rather, it allows for an asymmetric strategy where the relatively weak actors coerce strong actors. This form of coercion was utilised by former Libyan leader Gaddafi, who threatened to fill Europe with migrants if not granted sanction relief, and other financial and political concessions (Burtin, 2024). Perpetrators who are often weak or internationally illegitimate are incentivised by this tool due to its large bargaining advantages in comparison to its very few losses (Greenhill, 2008, p. 12). Thus, generating a crisis forces engagement and allows weaker actors to increase their leverage relative to their aggregate power, therefore triggering political instability within the target state. 

To conclude this section, the following typology shows that ‘weaponised migration’ is not a single monolithic phenomenon, but a set of strategic behaviours with varying aims and contexts. Political actors often combine these into a singular security threat narrative that overstates both purpose and consequence. Importantly, Greenhill (2008) also warns that the concept itself can be overused. The ‘weaponisation of the weaponisation of migration’ occurs when political actors exaggerate or dramatise claims of being targeted to justify restrictive immigration policies (Burtin, 2024). This indicates that the discourse surrounding migration manipulation can be just as politically consequential as the phenomenon itself. 

The Legal Perspective

The conceptual clarification between different forms of forced displacement is essential for legal analysis, as the argument that migration has been ‘weaponised’ does not dilute or suspend a state’s obligations under international law. Forced displacement is addressed through international human rights law (IHRL) and specific frameworks for refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). However, these frameworks vary depending on whether the displaced persons have crossed an international border. The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) states that “everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution” (United Nations, 1948, Art. 14). However, there is no mention of states having a duty to provide asylum, only to examine the asylum and justify the decision made. A central premise of IHRL is that protection does not depend on the political context in which displacement occurs. The 1951 Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees goes beyond the non-binding principles outlined in the 1948 declaration. The 1951 Refugee Convention established a universal definition of a ‘refugee’: someone outside their country of nationality with a ‘well-founded fear of being persecuted’,  making them unable or unwilling to return (UNHCR, 1951). Article 33 refers to the non-refoulement principle, which prohibits the return of a refugee to a territory where they face persecution, torture or inhumane treatment, regardless of how or why they arrived (UNHCR, 1951). 

The Belarus-EU border crisis highlights how states can frame the influx of people not as a migration issue but as a component of hybrid warfare or a national security threat. This political narrative has led to the normalisation of illegal practices at both the domestic and EU levels despite the presence of legal safeguards. In this context, the state-driven deployment of the concept of ‘weaponised migration’ serves as a coercive political framing that promotes the bypassing of existing legal frameworks, exemplified by the EU’s response to the crisis. Belarusian leader, Alexander Lukashenko, purposefully organised the transit of thousands of people to create a crisis intended to force concessions from EU member states, a strategy classified as coercive engineered migration (Greenhill, 2008, pp. 10-11; Vitiello, Montaldo and Peerboom, 2022, p. 584). While a state’s encouragement of migration for political leverage does not in itself constitute a violation of international law, receiving states frequently respond through unlawful deterrence practices. Within the EU, target states responded to this by classifying the influx not as a migration issue, but as a ‘hybrid attack’ and an imminent security threat (Petty, 2022, 114; Vitiello, Montaldo and Peerboom, 2022, 599). This political framing transforms vulnerable asylum seekers into security threats or dangerous weapons, providing the rhetorical justification of EU member states to suspend fundamental asylum rights for the sake of border protection (Vitiello, Montaldo and Peerboom, 2022; 600). This course of action led bordering EU member states, such as Lithuania, to enact emergency measures, including severe restrictions on access to asylum seekers’ applications to enable ‘pushbacks’ and the removal of the automatic suspensive effect of appeals (Vitiello, Montaldo and Peerboom, 2022; 600). Both measures are clear breaches of the right to apply for asylum and the principle of non-refoulement. Thus, the ‘weaponisation’ narrative allows states to portray rights-restricting practices as lawful and necessary, even when they are not. This reinforces that political rhetoric, rather than legal necessity, drives many contemporary responses to forced displacement. 

The Moral Perspective

The moral wrongness of weaponisation primarily lies within the instrumentalisation of human vulnerability. The framing of displaced people as ‘weapons’ constitutes a primary ethical failure because it treats human beings merely as instruments for a coercive political end, violating the fundamental Kantian principle of cosmopolitan right. Kant established the cosmopolitan right (jus cosmopoliticum) not as a virtue of sociability, but as a right belonging to all human beings (Benhabib, 2004). This right obliges the receiving sovereign to grant the stranger the ‘right of temporary sojourn’, anchored in the principle of the common possession of the earth’s surface (Benhabib, 2004, pp. 26-29). This moral obligation requires that a stranger not be treated as an enemy and that the refusal of ‘sojourn’ is impermissible if it would result in the stranger’s ‘destruction’ (Benhabib, 2004; 28). The rhetoric of ‘weaponisation’, however, enables states to disregard this fundamental norm claim by justifying illegal acts, such as pushbacks, placing the security interests of the sovereign state above the universal rights of humanity. The political use of the ‘weapon’ frame to justify the denial of protection evades the basic moral duty concerning the recognition of the rights of humanity, thereby reducing human beings to a utilitarian tool and ignoring their inherent dignity. 

Furthermore, labelling displaced people as ‘weapons’ constitutes a separate and serious ethical failure by employing dehumanising language that reverses victimhood and obstructs the reasoned debate necessary for ethical policymaking. The United Nations Security General explicitly warned against the ethical failures behind using dehumanising language, such as the use of the phrase ‘illegal immigrants’, as it blocks needed discussions surrounding the motives and needs of these individuals (Varaki and Vilaça, 2021, p. 221). Instead, political discourse embraces xenophobic narratives and the politicisation of the Refugee Crisis. This security rhetoric prevents leaders from exercising ‘representative thinking’, situating themselves in the shoes of other people, which demands the virtues of empathy and understanding (Varaki and Vilaça, 2021, p. 210-212). The antagonistic language allows states to prioritise ideas of self-preservation and security over the ‘imperfect moral duty’ to help the endangered, shifting moral blame from the state’s political actions to the suffering individuals (Benhabib, 2004, p. 36). This operates within the fundamental tension between universal human rights claims and particular cultural and national identities, as the political narrative successfully justifies the subordination of universal claims to sovereign interests, thus enabling the normalisation of illegal practices within political responses to contemporary forced displacement. 

The Policy Perspective

The ethical problems associated with framing displaced people as ‘weapons’ do not remain at the level of discourse; it is directly translated into concrete policy decisions. When migration is portrayed as a form of attack or imminent threat, this directly shapes the landscape in which borders are governed, what policies are deemed acceptable, and whose interests are protected. Despite the principle of nonrefoulement, this principle, along with Article 14 of the UDHR, is limited in that it does not explicitly state whether asylum seekers have the right to claim protection in a specific country (Costello, 2005). This gap within the international legal framework has created a space for policy manoeuvre by enabling the development of ‘safe third country’ practices that render asylum claims inadmissible on the basis that protection could have been sought elsewhere. The lack of international recognition for how the implementation of the safe third country concept should be governed has resulted in states utilising the legal gap to generate harmful and counterproductive policies that fit their political landscape.

A masked protestor stands against illegal immigration at a demonstration in September 2025 in Aberdeen, which was met with a counterprotest.
Source: Lucas Kendall via Wikimedia Commons

 A striking example of this occurring is within the UK’s policy surrounding border securitisation following an increase in migrant channel crossings. Securitisation discourse within the UK has intensified in response to the estimated 187,000 people arriving through boats on the English Channel since 2018, when figures were first recorded (Rawnsley, 2025). These crossings have sparked a significant anti-immigrant rhetoric in the UK and were utilised by the former UK Conservative government as part of Rishi Sunak’s ‘Stop the Boats’ campaign as well as aiding in the drafting of the UK-Rwanda plan, which would allow the UK to transfer its asylum seekers to Rwanda, where their asylum claims would be processed (Home Office, 2023). Conservative politicians framed the plan as a constitutional battle against internal enemies, whilst labelling dissenters as unwilling to tackle the threat to national security (Bonansinga and Forrest, 2025). Following the Supreme Court’s decision to block the initial relocation plan in November 2023, the government introduced the Safety of Rwanda Bill, asserting parliamentary sovereignty and using crisis rhetoric, such as labelling the UK asylum system as ‘broken’ and ‘abused’, to channel urgency and justify radical policies (Bonansinga and Forrest, 2025; 8-9). The primary effect of this legislation is the externalisation of asylum obligations through deterrence (Costello, 2005). By utilising legal gaps in the international framework, specifically the ‘safe third country’ concept, the policy renders asylum claims inadmissible on the basis that protection could have been sought elsewhere, thereby streamlining the removal of refugees to third countries (Costello, 2005).

The UK-Rwanda scheme serves as a clear demonstration of the instrumental weaponisation of migration, where asylum seekers are used as a means to achieve specific political goals. These goals are centered around rhetoric that migration poses an existential threat not only to national security and British identity but also to the economic well-being of the domestic workforce (Bonansinga and Forrest, 2025; 10).  Ultimately, this demonstrates that the true impact of the weaponisation narrative lies in how legal ambiguity is used politically to generate profound social instability, as seen in the use of antagonistic labels such as ‘internal enemies,’ which amplifies narratives of division and outrage for political gain rather than simply solving a migration problem (Bonansinga and Forrest, 2025; Costello, 2005). 

To conclude, the deliberate manipulation of migration flows, historically understood as the ‘weaponisation of migration’, is neither new nor unique, incorporating exportive, dispossessive, militarised and coercive strategies as identified by Greenhill (2008, 2022). While these strategies are strategically used by both state and non-state actors, political discourse frequently integrates them into a single security concern, inflating their significance and influence. Framing migrants as weapons is a potent type of dehumanising rhetoric that deprives individuals of their dignity and rights. The narrative of refugees as security threats rather than victims enables states to justify rights-eroding practices, even when the law prohibits such. Legal gaps, such as the indeterminacy of Article 14 of the UDHR, are operationalised politically to legitimise tactics such as the UK-Rwanda scheme, which externalises asylum commitments through deterrence-based policies. Collectively, these dynamics demonstrate that the real danger lies within the narrative itself, which transforms vulnerable individuals for political ends while undermining moral, legal and policy norms. 

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Daisymona Debesu
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DAISYMONA DEBESU


Daisymona is currently completing an MA in Peace, Security, and International Law at King’s College London Department of War Studies. Her areas of interest lie within foreign policy, public affairs, and the intersection of international law and politics.