“Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Nationhood” were defined by Tsar Nicholas I in the nineteenth century as the distinguishing creeds of Russian society.^[i] The revolutions of 1917 and the imposition of communism in Russia saw the persecution and destruction of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC). The state apparatus condoned the re-emergence of religion during the turmoil of the Great Patriotic War, but it remained heavily restricted. The collapse of the Soviet Union marked a new chapter for religion in the country, with increased religious freedoms and the creation of a secular Russian Federation. Article 14 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation states that “No religion may be established as a state or obligatory one. Religious associations shall be separated from the State and shall be equal before the law.”^[ii]

In contrast to the constitution, the late 1990s and early 2000s saw a slow process of desecularisation in Russia, with the ROC expanding its influence and becoming more closely associated with the state. The 2012 re-election of Vladimir Putin to the presidency marked a conservative turn in both domestic and foreign policy. Putin began drawing the ROC and its leader, Patriarch Kirill of Moscow, closer to the state and the “securitisation” of Russian religious vocabulary.^[iii]

The two phrases used by the ROC and the Russian Government that are explored in this investigation are ‘traditional values’ and ‘traditional religions.’ As summarised by Putin, “Traditional values are moral guidelines established by our ancestors over centuries. They form the foundation of our civilisation and identity, serve as a support for individual and family life, and shape our culture and a sovereign worldview that is resistant to attempts to impose foreign will.”^[iv] Putin expresses exactly how the concept of traditional values has come to be adopted in the Russian political context: a promotion of the conservative family model, Orthodox Christianity, anti-gender rights, anti-LGBTQ+ rights, and an emphasis on the sinful advances by the West to destroy these values. The traditional religions in the Russian context are Orthodoxy, Islam, Judaism, and Buddhism, which are all considered to enshrine traditional values in society.^[v] Putin has gone as far as to quote an unspecified theorist of Christianity to claim that Orthodoxy “is closer to Islam than Catholicism.”^[vi]

This essay will examine why Putin has drawn the ROC into his narratives on foreign policy since 2012. Initially, the focus will be on domestic Russian factors that contribute to the appeal of Orthodoxy as a political tool, drawing on data from the Pew Research Centre. The inquiry will then move on to how the narratives of traditional values and traditional religions are a valuable tool for Putin in an international context. Finally, there will be an analysis of how both the domestic and global contexts for Putin’s utilisation of the Orthodox Church culminate in narratives around the Ukraine war.

This investigation will argue that Putin integrates the ROC into foreign policy because it provides soft power, legitimises conservative narratives at home, and positions Russia internationally as the defender of “traditional values” against the liberal West. The war in Ukraine demonstrates how these narratives transform Russian geopolitical aims into a spiritual and civilisational struggle.

Before the closer alignment of the ROC and state apparatus in 2012, there were already significant existing narratives on the national authenticity of Russian Orthodoxy and the threat it faces from Western ‘non-traditional’ religions. In February 2000, there was a report by members of the Russian Academy for State Service that the Far East was facing an invasion from US, South Korean, and Canadian preachers who were attempting to convert the local populace to Protestantism.^[vii] This encroachment on the spiritual space of Russian Orthodoxy was posed as a direct threat to Russian statehood and autonomy, as well as a fear of infection of liberal ‘non-traditional’ sentiments among the populace. Duma religion committee chair Viktor Zorkaltsev articulated this fear of non-traditional religions in January 2002 concerning fears of Eastern conversion to Protestantism: “To lose the battle for hearts and minds in the modern world is a defeat far more serious than one in military strategy.”^[viii] Therefore, the increased utilisation of religion in Russian foreign policy by Putin’s regime after 2012 was not an unnatural step. There was already a precedent for internal fears about non-traditional religions encroaching on Russian territory, a domain that, despite the writings in the constitution, was considered distinctly Orthodox Christian. Essentially, the idea of the need to conduct a ‘spiritual securitisation’ of Russia against Protestantism and Catholicism had already been disseminated. Putin’s move in 2012 was to legitimise and capitalise on these sentiments for political gain and domestic support in anti-Western foreign policy.

Another domestic explanation for Putin’s use of the ROC in the execution of foreign policy is the developing association of Orthodoxy with Russian national identity. In 1991, 31% of Russians identified themselves as Orthodox Christians.^[ix] By 2011, the number of Russians identifying as Orthodox had increased to 71%.^[x] At face value, this would lend itself to the analysis that Putin utilises Russian Orthodoxy, as it provides access to an increasingly large majority of the population and allows political foreign policy messaging to be readily transmitted through its established networks. This analysis, however, would be too reductionist in its evaluation of Putin’s government’s motivations, as Pew reported that of the 101 million reported Orthodox Christians in Russia, only 6% attend church weekly, and only 15% say that ‘religion is very important.’^[xi] These statistics illuminate an apathetic tendency of Russians towards practising Orthodoxy, but also demonstrate how Orthodoxy is increasingly a vital component of Russian conservative identity. A 2012 survey found that 69% of Russians believed that being Orthodox was an essential element of being a “true” Russian.^[xii] When combined with changes in public perception on key issues surrounding traditional values, this can provide an illuminating picture of Putin’s motivations for using Orthodoxy in foreign policy.In 2005, 34% of Russians wanted same-sex marriage to be banned. ^[xiii] By 2015, this number was up to 91%.^[xiv] Furthermore, the inadmissibility of abortion in the eyes of the Russian public increased from 12% in 1995 to 35% in 2018.^[xv]

The increasing adoption of traditional values, alongside an increase in Russian identification with Orthodoxy as a national identity, provided the unique potential for Putin to utilise Orthodoxy to unify these sentiments under one banner. This notion is in part summarised by academic Alicja Curanovic when they say that the specification of traditional values by the Russian state, in conjunction with the ROC, “strengthens the impression that Russian traditional values are synonymous with religious ones and thereby increases the tendency for equating “Russianness” with ‘Orthodox Christianity.’”^[xvi]Combined with the statistics above, Curanovic’s argument is convincing: the ROC’s value to Putin’s government lies not in piety but in nationalism. Orthodoxy becomes a cultural soft-power network juxtaposed against Western liberalism. This notion is truly articulated by Patriarch Kirill, who stated in 2011, “the most fundamental conflict of our present era is the clash between the liberal model of civilisation on the one hand and national, cultural, and religious identity, on the other.”^[xvii] Patriarch Kirill’s framing of an international conflict between liberal and traditional values is something Putin consistently utilises to try to gain international support for Russia.

The definition of ‘traditional religions’ inside both the Russian state and ROC narratives allows for the use of the phrase to generate broad global appeal. Referred to as “Religious Diplomacy” by Alicja Curanovic, there are constant assertions made by Putin and Patriarch Kirill on Russia’s strong stance on pro-life, anti-gender rights, and anti-LGBTQ+ rights, which is inherently rooted in Russia’s Orthodox history.^[xviii] Putin, speaking in 2013, stated that “we know that there are more and more people in the world who support our position to protect the national values that for thousands of years have formed the spiritual and moral basis of civilisation, of every nation.”^[xix] This broad outreach to traditional religions, which is facilitated by the collaboration between the ROC and Putin’s foreign policy, positions Russian Orthodoxy and traditional values as a point of common consensus in the global order.

As with the weaponisation of internal Russian fears of infringements by non-traditional religions and Western liberalism on state autonomy, Putin utilises the ROC in an international setting to serve a similar function. Since 2012, there have been almost continuous references by both Putin and Patriarch Kirill about the aggressive nature of Western Liberalism and how it is being used to undermine countries’ autonomy. One such example comes from Patriarch Kirill in March 2024, when he stated that “Russia must become a refuge for all compatriots worldwide suffering from the encroachment of Western globalism, wars, and discrimination. In addition to our compatriots, our country can become a haven for millions of foreigners who defend traditional values.”^[xx] Putin is using the ROC as a mouthpiece for these narratives of Western infringements on sovereignty, while centring Russia as the protector of the traditional world. The ROC provides a legitimising platform to spread these narratives and provide backup for Putin’s foreign policy and the dissemination of anti-Western sentiments on the international stage. This analysis is concisely summarised by academics Irina Du Quenoy and Dmitry Dubrovskiy, who say that the ROC, “could tap into a powerful transnational network, present a positive message, and have contemporary forward-thinking appeal.”^[xxi]

Furthermore, this collaboration between the state and ROC in international foreign policy has been a soft-power technique used by the government even before Putin’s 2012 re-election and conservative shift. In 2008, Patriarch Kirill was involved in drafting a resolution proposed by Russia to enshrine traditional values in the UN Human Rights Council. The mandate of the resolution was aimed at “Promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms through a better understanding of the traditional values of humankind.”^[xxii] The UN adopted this mandate, which neatly demonstrates that the utilisation of the ROC in Russian foreign policy post-2012 was not an unnatural step for Putin to take, but rather something that had been growing in collaboration since the early 2000s and his ascension to power. It just took on greater emphasis after his re-election.

The 2022 invasion of Ukraine by Russian forces saw an upsurge in narratives surrounding ‘traditional values’ and ‘traditional religions’ inside Russian foreign policy and ROC communications. The invasion of Ukraine saw a blending of narratives previously investigated in this study by the Russian state, which attempted to justify the military action. Ideas of spiritual security, the notion that an attack on a nation’s spirituality is a matter of national defence, and the ‘canonical territory’ of the Russian Orthodox Church, were used to portray the military as rooted in religious grounds and protective of Ukrainian Orthodox Christians.^[xxiii] In the lead-up to the February 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, Putin characterised Ukraine and Russia as “essentially the same historical and spiritual space.”^[xxiv]  Putin is utilising Orthodoxy and Russia’s historical importance in the religion to pose the war in Ukraine as not only a ‘special military operation’ aiming to eliminate Ukrainian Nazis, but also to protect the spiritual security of the Ukrainian people who are facing repression. The ROC is well-suited to this role because of its domestic appeal in Russia and its international presence. Throughout the war, Patriarch Kirill has been instrumental in presenting the conflict as a ‘holy war’ with ‘metaphysical’ significance for the protection of the spirituality of the Donbas region.^[xxv] Kirill goes as far as to say that the invasion of Ukraine, “is about human salvation, about where humanity will end up, on which side of God the Saviour.”^[xxvi]

The Moscow Patriarch and the ROC provide an opportunity for Putin to justify his war in Ukraine through four different avenues. Firstly, the ROC can be used to gain domestic support for the invasion, with Patriarch Kirill circulating ideas of direct threats to Orthodox life.^[xxvii] Secondly, the invasion can be framed as attempting to protect Orthodox Christians in Ukraine from threats to their spiritual security. Thirdly, the ROC’s links to Ukraine can be used to extend Russia’s borders to Ukraine’s borders because of their supposedly shared religion and history, with Patriarch Kirill emphasising the need to defend the ‘canonical territory’ of the ‘holy Rus.’^[xxviii] Finally, the ROC can be used to frame the Russian military as protectors of traditional values to a global audience. The Russian army is a fighting force against Western liberal expansion, with Kirill stating that the fighting is the “fundamental rejection of the so-called values proposed today by those who claim global power.”^[xxix] The importance of these narratives to Putin’s justification for the invasion is evident in Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s references to Ukraine’s alignment with American values. When asked recently in an interview with The Guardian, he stated that, “in terms of values, Ukraine is much closer to the US than Russia.”^[xxx]

In conclusion, Putin utilises the ROC in the execution of foreign policy, as it provides a form of soft power that legitimises domestic conservatism and positions Russia internationally as the defender of “traditional values” against the liberal West. Internally, the ROC can be used as a spearhead of Russian nationalism and a pre-made transnational and domestic network to circulate pro-Russian, anti-Western sentiments. The war in Ukraine demonstrates how these narratives transform geopolitical aims into a spiritual and civilisational struggle. Domestically, the ROC serves as a vehicle through which the state can consolidate support, mobilise conceptions of “Russianness,” and legitimise conservative narratives that frame Orthodoxy as both culturally authentic and under threat from Western liberalism. Internationally, the Church provides a platform for projecting Russia as a defender of “traditional values” within a global civilisational divide, enabling the Kremlin to extend its soft power through appeals to shared moral commitments articulated by other traditional religions. These dynamics converge most clearly in the war in Ukraine, where geopolitical objectives are reframed as a spiritual mission, the protection of “canonical territory,” and the defence of Orthodoxy against alleged Western encroachment. The ROC’s institutional alignment with the state transforms foreign policy into a moral and metaphysical struggle, reinforcing narratives that elevate Russia’s actions beyond strategic interest and into civilisational struggle. This is an ongoing area of investigation that would benefit from further research. An illuminating further study on this topic would be a discourse analysis of how public language from both Putin and Patriarch Kirill has developed since 2000 regarding the alignment of Russian foreign policy with Orthodox Christianity. This could be coupled with an investigative analysis of the effectiveness of such narratives in winning global support from countries such as Ethiopia and Serbia, which have large Orthodox populations. Such an  investigation could seek to see how the two power structures in Russia collaborate, reinforce or conflict with each other. 

Bibliography

Cooperman, Alan, and Neha Sahgal. ‘Orthodox Christianity in the 21st Century’. Pew Research Center, 8 November 2017. https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2017/11/08/orthodox-christianity-in-the-21st-century/.

Curanovic, Alicja. The Religious Factor in Russia’s Foreign Policy: Keeping God on Our Side. 1st ed. Routledge Contemporary Russia and Eastern Europe Series 31. Routledge, 2012. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203133279.

Curanovic, Alicja. ‘Weaknesses of the Post-Soviet Religious Model: The Kremlin and “Traditional” Religions in Face of Interethnic Tensions in Russia’. Politics and Religion (New York, USA) 7, no. 4 (2014): 788–817. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755048314000613.

Fagan, Geraldine. Believing in Russia – Religious Policy after Communism. Taylor & Francis Group, 2012. http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/kcl/detail.action?docID=1075436.

Fagan, Geraldine. ‘In Double Jeopardy: For Ukrainian Orthodox Church, A War on Two Fronts’. Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe 43, no. 3 (2023). https://doi.org/10.55221/2693-2148.2417.

Harding, Luke. ‘Volodymyr Zelenskyy: Why Should I Be Afraid of Donald Trump?’ World News. The Guardian, 9 November 2025. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/nov/09/volodymyr-zelenskyy-why-should-i-be-afraid-donald-trump.

Kilp, Alar, and Jerry G. Pankhurst. ‘The Mandate of the World Russian People’s Council and the Russian Political Imagination: Scripture, Politics and War’. Religions (Basel, Switzerland ) (Basel) 16, no. 4 (2025): 466-. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel16040466.

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Kirill, Patriarch. ‘The Decree of the 25th World Russian People’s Council “The Present and Future of the Russian World”’. Patriarchia.Ru, 27 March 2024. https://www.patriarchia.ru/article/105523.

Quenoy, Irina du, and Dmitry Dubrovskiy. Violence and the Defense of “Traditional Values” in the Russian Federation. Religion and Violence in Russia. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 2018. JSTOR. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep22453.8.

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Stepanova, Elena. ‘“The Spiritual and Moral Foundation of Civilization in Every Nation for Thousands of Years”: The Traditional Values Discourse in Russia’. Politics, Religion & Ideology 16, nos 2–3 (2015): 119–36. https://doi.org/10.1080/21567689.2015.1068167.

Stoyanov, Yuri. ‘The War in Ukraine: Challenges to Just War Doctrines in Eastern Orthodoxy’. Studies in Christian Ethics (London, England) 37, no. 3 (2024): 669–92. https://doi.org/10.1177/09539468241258947.

Uzlaner, Dmitry, and Kristina Stoeckl. ‘From Pussy Riot’s “punk Prayer” to Matilda: Orthodox Believers, Critique, and Religious Freedom in Russia’. Journal of Contemporary Religion (Abingdon) 34, no. 3 (2019): 427–45. https://doi.org/10.1080/13537903.2019.1658432.

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^[i] Geraldine Fagan, Believing in Russia – Religious Policy after Communism (Taylor & Francis Group, 2012), 19, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/kcl/detail.action?docID=1075436.

^[ii] Article 14, The Constitution of the Russian Federation, § 14 (1993), http://www.constitution.ru/en/10003000-02.htm.

^[iii] Yuri Stoyanov, ‘The War in Ukraine: Challenges to Just War Doctrines in Eastern Orthodoxy’, Studies in Christian Ethics (London, England) 37, no. 3 (2024): 674, https://doi.org/10.1177/09539468241258947.

^[iv] Bajuškina Natalʹja Sergeevna, Putin nazval važnoj temu razrabotki politiki v sfere zaŝity tradicionnyh cennostej, Izvestija, 10 ijunja 2025, https://iz.ru/1901787/2025-06-10/putin-nazval-vazhnoi-temu-razvitiia-politiki-v-oblasti-zashchity-traditcionnykh-tcennostei.

^[v] Alicja Curanovic, The Religious Factor in Russia’s Foreign Policy: Keeping God on Our Side, 1st ed., Routledge Contemporary Russia and Eastern Europe Series 31 (Routledge, 2012), 790, https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203133279.

^[vi] Fagan, Believing in Russia – Religious Policy after Communism, 280.

^[vii] Fagan, Believing in Russia – Religious Policy after Communism, 155.

^[viii] Victor Zorkaltsev, January 2002 in Fagan, Believing in Russia – Religious Policy after Communism, 156.

^[ix] Irina du Quenoy and Dmitry Dubrovskiy, Violence and the Defense of “Traditional Values” in the Russian Federation, Religion and Violence in Russia (Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 2018), 82, JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep22453.8.

^[x] Alan Cooperman and Neha Sahgal, ‘Orthodox Christianity in the 21st Century’, Pew Research Center, 8 November 2017, 23, https://www.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/20/2017/12/Orthodoxy-II-FULL-REPORT-12-5.pdf

^[xi] Cooperman and Sahgal, ‘Orthodox Christianity in the 21st Century’, 28.

^[xii] Curanovic, The Religious Factor in Russia’s Foreign Policy, 797.

^[xiii] du Quenoy and Dubrovskiy, Violence and the Defense of “Traditional Values” in the Russian Federation, 82.

^[xiv] Cooperman and Sahgal, ‘Orthodox Christianity in the 21st Century’, 49.

^[xv] du Quenoy and Dubrovskiy, Violence and the Defense of “Traditional Values” in the Russian Federation, 83.

^[xvi] Curanovic, The Religious Factor in Russia’s Foreign Policy, 808.

^[xvii] Patriarch Kirill, 2011 quoted in Elena Stepanova, ‘“The Spiritual and Moral Foundation of Civilization in Every Nation for Thousands of Years”: The Traditional Values Discourse in Russia’, Politics, Religion & Ideology 16, nos 2–3 (2015): 129, https://doi.org/10.1080/21567689.2015.1068167.

^[xviii] Alicja Curanovic, ‘Weaknesses of the Post-Soviet Religious Model: The Kremlin and “Traditional” Religions in Face of Interethnic Tensions in Russia’, Politics and Religion (New York, USA) 7, no. 4 (2014): 796, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755048314000613.

^[xix] Vladimir Putin, 2013 du Quenoy and Dubrovskiy, Violence and the Defense of “Traditional Values” in the Russian Federation, 76.

^[xx] Patriarch Kirill, ‘Patriarchal Sermon on Cheesefare Sunday after Liturgy in the Cathedral of Christ the Savior’, Patriarchia.Ru, 6 March 2024, https://www.patriarchia.ru/article/102978.

^[xxi] du Quenoy and Dubrovskiy, Violence and the Defense of “Traditional Values” in the Russian Federation, 78.

^[xxii] Fagan, Believing in Russia – Religious Policy after Communism, 196.

^[xxiii] Stoyanov, ‘The War in Ukraine’, 678.

^[xxiv] Geraldine Fagan, ‘In Double Jeopardy: For Ukrainian Orthodox Church, A War on Two Fronts’, Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe 43, no. 3 (2023): 67, https://doi.org/10.55221/2693-2148.2417.

^[xxv] Patriarch Kirill, ‘The Decree of the 25th World Russian People’s Council “The Present and Future of the Russian World”’, Patriarchia.Ru, 27 March 2024, https://www.patriarchia.ru/article/105523.

^[xxvi] Kirill, ‘The Decree of the 25th World Russian People’s Council “The Present and Future of the Russian World”’.

^[xxvii] Alar Kilp and Jerry G. Pankhurst, ‘The Mandate of the World Russian People’s Council and the Russian Political Imagination: Scripture, Politics and War’, Religions (Basel, Switzerland ) (Basel) 16, no. 4 (2025): 4, https://doi.org/10.3390/rel16040466.

^[xxviii] Stepanova, “The War in Ukraine: Challenges to Just War Doctrines in Eastern Orthodoxy.” 678.

^[xxix] Kirill, ‘The Decree of the 25th World Russian People’s Council “The Present and Future of the Russian World”’.

^[xxx] Volodymyr Zelenskyy quoted in Luke Harding, ‘Volodymyr Zelenskyy: Why Should I Be Afraid of Donald Trump?’, World News, The Guardian, 9 November 2025, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/nov/09/volodymyr-zelenskyy-why-should-i-be-afraid-donald-trump.