
Introduction
Although the concept of power has accompanied humankind since time immemorial, the discipline of International Relations (IR) has often treated it as a largely uncontested concept. It could be argued that for more than a century the dominant approach has adhered to a realist conception of power —the capability to impose one’s will upon others. This matters because the role that power plays in negotiations is constrained by the conception of power held by the actors involved. If interlocutors enter dialogue with only a singular, rigid conception of power, then the range of possible power shifts and negotiation outcomes is significantly reduced. In this sense, the notion of power is not fixed, but flexible, contingent, and relational. There are strategic practices that allow actors to reshape their perceived influence and realise that they may be far more capable of affecting the aftermath than they initially believed. As the Montenegrin intellectual Siniša Vuković observes, “power is neither equal to a sum of possessions nor a sum of results, but rather a dynamic that should be assessed through action, and reaction of participating actors, and through the nexus of will (interests and resources) and skill (ability to translate the resources into a desired outcome).”[i]
This dynamic is illustrated by the participation of the Marshall Islands in the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP-21) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). In the lead-up to Paris, the host city, Tony de Brum, the country’s then Foreign Minister, strategically cultivated alliances across multiple existing blocs, including Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), the Least Developed Countries (LDC) Group, and the Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Group.[ii] This multilayered coalition-building fundamentally altered the perception of power within the negotiation environment, granting a small and structurally vulnerable state an unexpected degree of diplomatic leverage. Their influence emerged not from military force or economic strength, but from what I call coalitional power, further elaborated in this article. Former Uruguayan President Pepe Mujica, who I profoundly admire for his principled and human-centred leadership, observes, “power does not reside in offices; real power lies among the people, in the collective conscience.”[iii] His words, as well as the Marshall Islands involvement in the COP-21, invite us to reconsider not only what power is, but where it resides. Analyzing the latter demonstrates that the sources, forms, and methods through which power is applied during negotiations are more adaptable than traditional hierarchies would allow us to believe.
The Stagnating Evolution of the Concept of Power
As previously stated, power undeniably plays a central role in negotiations. How it comes into play depends not only on each converser’s individual understanding of power, but, even more importantly, on the shared conceptualization of it within the room. When two or more parties interact, it is not simply the objective possession of resources, authority, or leverage that determines the unfolding of negotiations, but rather how these elements are perceived, interpreted, and recognised among those present. This point is made particularly evident in I. William Zartman’s 2002 formulation: “It is clear that … it is the perception of power – or more precisely, the reality of power mediated by perception – that is involved in questions of symmetry and asymmetry, rather than raw measures of force or resources.”[iv] In other words, power is not merely something actors have; it is something they actively see, feel, and negotiate. This is why I consider it essential to re-examine the definition of power and how it has or has not evolved, as doing so becomes crucial to answering the central question: What role does power play in negotiations?
Over the course of centuries, the dominant conception of power in IR has, in many respects, become fossilised. I would argue that the earliest recorded conceptualisation of power can be traced to Thucydides. In approximately 400 BCE, he records the Melian Dialogue, in which the Athenian imperial envoys proclaim to the Melian leaders, “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.”[v] If Thucydides’ formulation feels too historically remote, we may instead consider a later and equally influential articulation. In 1860, Carl von Clausewitz famously described war, which may be understood as the purest and most unmasked expression of power, as “an act of violence to compel the enemy to fulfil our will.” [vi] We may then move forward once more, to the 1920s, where Max Weber’s definition in “Economy and Society” echoes a strikingly similar logic: “Power is the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be able to carry out his own will despite resistance.” [vii]
At this point, it becomes difficult not to notice that these three statements, which are separated by historical eras, political systems, geographical contexts, and philosophical traditions, articulate essentially the same understanding: power refers, above all else, to a given actor’s ability to achieve their desired outcome, considering their opponents’ power to do the same. Perhaps more remarkable is that, although more than 1,500 years separated Thucydides and Weber, with Clausewitz standing between them, both articulated strikingly similar conceptions of power. The idea continued to be understood as the ability to shape action, impose will, and determine outcomes. It remained a quiet, persistent force guiding the delicate dance of negotiations. As this predominantly realist understanding of power became increasingly embedded in IR, it shaped not only diplomatic encounters, treaties, and wartime decision-making, but also the very architecture of the contemporary international system.
The Release of Power from its Fixed Interpretation
It was more formally at the beginning of the 21st century that prestigious academics, like Joseph S. Nye, Zartman, and Vuković, realized that this paradigm was in fact not all-encompassing and that it limited the role that power played during the unfolding of negotiations. Until this point, power had largely been understood as a stage manager rather than an actor between negotiating parties. It shaped the conditions under which negotiations unfolded, but was rarely recognised as a variable that could itself be negotiated, redefined, or strategically employed. As its definition was pretty much distilled and ergo too simplistic, the perceived symmetry during (or lack thereof) depended almost directly on the common grasp of raw power, mainly understood, as Kenneth Waltz points out, as the estimation of states’ capabilities,[viii] frequently political, economic, and / or military. As Ludwig Wittgenstein famously noted, “the limits of my language mean the limits of my world.”[ix] In other words, what cannot be named does not fully enter the realm of shared recognition or negotiation. This is why the role that power plays in negotiations drastically changed when the specified academics, among others, took out a scalpel and started to dissect the classification of power in many other complex ways that immensely benefited negotiations.
Specifically, it became a necessity for power references to be expressed as two-word constructions, where the “prefix” designates the specific face of power at play. These developments did not emerge in isolation. As the post-1945 international order became increasingly institutionalised and interconnected, traditional conceptions of power could no longer fully account for influence in international politics. In The Many Faces of Power, Vuković synthesises the principal forms and functions that power assumes in negotiations, building on concepts such as Nye’s hard and soft power. Hard power[x] refers to coercive strategic strength grounded in material resources and the credible threat or use of force. Soft power, by contrast, inspires others to want outcomes they may not have otherwise desired, relying on attraction, cultural legitimacy, and shared values. These two may combine into smart power, the calibrated blend of coercion and persuasion in pursuit of foreign policy goals. Authoritarian influence strategies often employ sharp power,[xi] which ‘pierces’ and manipulates the political and informational environments of others. In the digital domain, cyber power is the capacity to shape outcomes through control of information systems and networks. At the negotiation table, actors also draw upon tactical power, the skilful use of framing, sequencing, coalition-building, and situational positioning to direct how the interaction progresses.[xii]
Readers, we may now finally exhale. After more than 1,500 years of fossilization, the model of power became way more flexible, and so did the role it plays at the negotiating table. While the realist lens that sees power as raw, hard, and forceful, continues to be the most visible mask it wears, it is no longer the only one. Academic demystification has broadened its nomenclature and, with it, the repertoire of the negotiator. Modern practitioners can now draw upon a richer set of tools to shift both their own and the shared perception of power when shaping agreements. This diversification of power’s classification has been particularly constructive for delegates entering discussions from a position of apparent disadvantage. As the post-1945 international order became increasingly institutionalised and interconnected, opportunities for coalition-building and collective influence expanded beyond material capabilities alone. By engaging more deeply with the tactical dimension of power, they can mobilise what I refer to as coalitional power, a form of power that does not arise from material superiority, but from the careful cultivation of diplomatically constructive relations over time. It is the strength drawn from alliances, shared interests, mutual recognition, and the ability to stand with others.
When negotiators are equipped with this conceptual understanding, perceived asymmetry is no longer synonymous with overall dismissal and default compliance-orientation. As Zartman highlights, “coalitions are likely to form to offset the initial power disadvantage and to transform submission into resistance.” [xiii] Furthermore, hard power can be subverted by reframing negotiations through the Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA), a concept developed by Roger Fisher, co-author of Getting to Yes. He discloses, while power is often assumed to derive from material resources (wealth, status, alliances, physical force, or political influence), in practice, what truly determines power is the relative attractiveness of disengagement.[xiv] In other words, the party who can afford not to reach an agreement holds the greater leverage. This instrument is available to any actor capable of recognising their alternatives and with sufficient space to step away from negotiations (when convenient).
The Dynamics of Power in the Paris Agreement Negotiations: The Unexpected Influence of the High Ambition Coalition
The Paris Agreement was configured in 2015 during COP-21 within the UNFCCC. Surprisingly, the participation of the Marshall Islands, a state that is neither part of the G20 nor typically recognised as a predominant actor in international diplomacy, made an unforgettable intervention that shifted the perception of power among the 195 participating states. At the time, Tony de Brum was the Foreign Minister of the aforementioned state. His final statements at the Closing Plenary heavily influenced those parties that were initially more sceptical about signing an agreement under such ambitious conditions for the drastic reduction of greenhouse gas emissions (including the United States, China, and Brazil, among others). He managed to shift their perception of power, arguably by implementing two main strategies: (1) he mobilised coalitional power (the “mosquito” technique) and (2) he introduced new information in concentrated form during the conference. As Janice Gross Stein argues, actors are most likely to revise their prior assumptions when confronted with sudden, concentrated new data. Indeed, “shifts in beliefs tend to be stronger when new information is received in large, concentrated bursts, rather than gradually.”[xv]
It was through this strategic framing and timing that de Brum spearheaded the formation of the High Ambition Coalition (HAC), [xvi] which ultimately reconfigured the balance of power in Paris. The HAC is an informal alliance of developed and developing states within the UNFCCC committed to advancing stronger climate action and securing the highest possible ambition of the Paris Agreement.[xvii] As the widely used proverb in the Natural Sciences reminds us, “there is safety in numbers,” and this is precisely what de Brum leveraged in order to amplify influence, regardless of the limited hard power of the Marshall Islands. Making use of coalitional power, in that same year, de Brum described the HAC as a “mosquito fleet,” which sent diplomatic envoys to states with whom they held bilateral relationships to “bite them in a nice way.” [xviii] This example underscores how the role of power is often rooted less in material capability than in the perception of power itself, shaped by the conceptual lenses through which we define it. Regardless of military or economic capacity, all states (and people) can become high impact ‘mosquitos.’ Ultimately, this method enabled the inclusion of language committing parties to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, an objective that many observers considered unlikely to be adopted at the outset of the negotiations. As de Brum remarked, diplomacy “for us is not an art; it is a necessary tool of survival.”[xix]
Conclusion
Power is not something carved in stone nor solely measured through military or institutional influence. Rather, it is contingent on the ‘actions’ and ‘reactions’ of the people carrying out negotiations. It is a ‘many-faced’ word, capable of being shaped, reframed, and even reinvented by state representatives, intellectuals, private actors, and ordinary individuals alike in the everyday theatre of interaction. Power is less a possession than a performance and its worth lies in how it is enacted and perceived. To understand power is, therefore, to comprehend that its force resides not in its existence alone, but in its ability to shift the emotional, cognitive, and strategic horizon of the other, dependent on a diversified rolodex of definitions. And once one accepts that power is dynamic, the negotiation table becomes less of a battlefield and more of a stage.
The release of power from its rigid interpretation allowed the discipline of IR to expand its conceptual vocabulary and, with it, the strategic repertoire employed by states in negotiation. Power can still manifest as the traditional hard edge of coercion, but it is no longer confined to it. Today, it may be hard, soft, smart, sharp, cyber, tactical, and crucially, coalitional power. Even ‘mosquitoes’ can guide the hand of giants; the Marshall Islands did not need to command armies to shape the trajectory of the Paris Agreement, they needed conviction, coordination, and, above all, allies. Coalition-building, narrative framing and strategic sequencing can tilt the scale far more than brute strength alone. Above all, preparing for negotiation through techniques such as Fisher’s BATNA allows actors to overcome an apparent disadvantage in classical power, into leverage with regards to the disparate urgency of each party’s interests. Once we recognise the concept as layered and malleable, the negotiation stage ceases to be a simple contest of strength and becomes a domain where creativity and diplomatic imagination can determine outcomes.
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- Fisher, Roger, William Ury, and Bruce Patton. Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement without Giving In. 2nd ed. Penguin Books, 1991.
- “José Mujica.” Accessed November 7, 2025. https://www.casamerica.es/politica/jose-mujica.
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- Stein, Janice Gross. “Foreign Policy Decision-Making: Rational, Psychological, and Neurological Models.” In Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases, 2nd ed., edited by Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield, and Tim Dunne. Oxford University Press, 2012.
- The High Ambition Coalition. “The High Ambition Coalition.” Accessed November 6, 2025. https://www.highambitioncoalition.org.
- Thucydides. History of the Peloponnesian War. Edited by Rex Warner and Moses Israel Finley. Penguin Books, 1985.
- Vuković, Siniša. “The Many Faces of Power in Diplomatic Negotiations.” SAIS Review of International Affairs 40, no. 1 (2020): 45–57. https://doi.org/10.1353/sais.2020.0004.
- Walker, Christopher, and Jessica Ludwig. “The Meaning of Sharp Power: How Authoritarian States Project Influence | Foreign Affairs.” November 16, 2017. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2017-11-16/meaning-sharp-power.
- Waltz, Kenneth N. Theory of International Politics. Addison-Wesley, 1979.
- Weber, Max. Economy and Society. Edited by Guenter Roth and Claus Wittich. Vol. 1. University of California Press, 1978.
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Kegan Paul, 1922.
- Yamin, Farhana. “The High Ambition Coalition.” In Negotiating the Paris Agreement, 1st ed., edited by Henrik Jepsen, Magnus Lundgren, Kai Monheim, and Hayley Walker. Cambridge University Press, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108886246.012.
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[i] Vuković, “The Many Faces of Power in Diplomatic Negotiations,” 53.
[ii] The High Ambition Coalition, “The High Ambition Coalition,” 216–244.
[iii] “José Mujica,” 1-3.
[iv] Zartman, “The Study of Power and the Practice of Negotiation,” 20.
[v] Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 402.
[vi] Carl von Clausewitz, On War, II.
[vii] Weber, Economy and Society, 1:53.
[viii] Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 131.
[ix] Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, proposition 5.6.
[x] Formerly referred to as raw, coercive power.
[xi] Walker and Ludwig, “The Meaning of Sharp Power,” 1-3.
[xii] Vuković, “The Many Faces of Power in Diplomatic Negotiations,” 48-51.
[xiii] Zartman, “The Study of Power and the Practice of Negotiation,” 17.
[xiv] Fisher et al., Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement without Giving In, 97–106.
[xv] Stein, “Foreign Policy Decision-Making: Rational, Psychological, and Neurological Models,” 135.
[xvi] It is important to note that prior to its formal establishment, the coalition was preceded by extensive pre-negotiations led by Tony de Brum, earlier in 2015.
[xvii] The High Ambition Coalition, “The High Ambition Coalition,” sec. 1.
[xviii] Mathiesen and Harvey, “Climate Coalition Breaks Cover in Paris to Push for Binding and Ambitious Deal,” 1.
[xix] “Minister de Brum of Marshall Islands Calls for Massive Global Response to Climate Crisis | Climate & Development Knowledge Network,” 1.
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