Humanitarian assistance and development aid have long comprised the fundamental tools for international responses to conflict. Yet, as this conference’s theme recognises, these tools are facing unprecedented challenges from funding shortfalls, increasing global instability, and the decline of the rules-based international order. The conference’s panels help conceptualise what might come next, specifically through analysing donor priorities, aid mechanisms, local adaptation, and geopolitical influence. Discussing these factors, however, requires a comprehensive understanding of what has changed on the ground in conflict-affected contexts in the lead-up to the current global paradigm.

This analysis  foregrounds the idea of a ‘post-aid world’ in terms of the changing nature of ‘humanitarian space.’ Humanitarian space comprises the boundaries and operations of humanitarian assistance in complex emergencies, or humanitarian crises in contexts of large-scale violent conflict (Keen, 2008, 1). The nature of ‘humanitarian space’ has changed in two significant ways in recent years. First, it has become more permeable to interference by external actors, whereby its boundaries have become more vulnerable to external interference due to weakened multilateral institutions and geopolitical contestation. This has resulted in drastic increases in aid blockage and targeted attacks within humanitarian space, as seen in Israel’s war in Gaza (2023-present). Second, it has become more strained as a result of funding pressures. This has constrained operations, resulting in aid networks too overstretched to respond to humanitarian needs, clearly seen in the Sudanese civil war (2023-present). Planning for a post-aid paradigm, therefore, requires a robust understanding of how future models and adaptations will interact with boundary permeability and operational strain in an increasingly unstable world. 

Humanitarian Space: Boundaries and Operations 

The ‘nature’ of humanitarian space comprises two key aspects: the principles that serve as boundaries between it and the realm of conflict; and its operations, or the processes and outcomes that take place within it. 

‘Humanitarian space’ is a concept introduced by former Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) director Rony Brauman, who articulated a theoretical operating environment conducive to the delivery of humanitarian aid, based on the principles of independence and neutrality (Clouette & Wise, 2017, 7). These derive from the four core principles of humanitarian intervention: humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and independence. Independence refers to the political autonomy of humanitarian actors, while neutrality requires these actors to refrain from taking part in conflict or taking sides between conflict parties (Rose et al., 2013, 75; Barnett & Weiss, 2008, 3). If these principles are followed and respected, as Barnett and Weiss (2008) argue, then humanitarian space serves as a “sanctuary for aid workers and victims,” ensuring access to vulnerable populations and preventing targeting by belligerents (4).

The principles that separate humanitarian space from the realm of conflict are, however, blurry and dependent upon the perceptions of conflict parties, as evidenced by experiences since the end of the Cold War. In the complex emergencies of the 1990s, UN humanitarian operations faced extreme operational challenges and dangers, spurring interventions authorised by the UN Security Council (UNSC) to protect and facilitate aid delivery (Roberts, 1997, 22-23). States and multilateral institutions also increasingly linked humanitarian aid with security interests after the September 11 attacks, with the United States in particular viewing counterterrorism and humanitarianism as complementary tools (Barnett & Weiss, 2008, 25; Barnett, 2011, 192-193). Moreover, different humanitarian actors prioritise independence and neutrality to differing degrees, ranging from strict adherents like the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), to human rights-focused actors like CARE International, to more interest-focused bilateral aid agencies like the former US Agency for International Development (USAID) (Barnett, 2011, 171-194).

Another key aspect of the humanitarian space is what occurs within its boundaries, or its operations. According to the ICRC Director-General, humanitarian space comprises both tangible aspects (such as hospitals, water networks, refugee camps) and “effective and sustainable impact” (Mardini, 2021). Funding is an indirect component of these operations by enabling their existence, with humanitarian actors deriving funding from established donors, funding appeals, and instruments such as the UN Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) (Rose et al., 2013, 83-84). This funding is channelled into four key operational sectors in complex emergencies: health, food, shelter, and water/sanitation (Rose et al., 2013, 76-81).

Two aspects of humanitarian operations are the subject of scholarly debate: processes and outcomes. The wake of the Rwandan genocide led to a proliferation of evaluation metrics intended to trace the transparency of humanitarian processes, serving to legitimise the humanitarian space as professional and rooted in international law and human rights norms (Rose et al., 2013, 84; Kennedy, 2019; 208).. Outcomes are also critical, given the long-running academic discussion on the benefits and harms of humanitarian aid. While Barber (1997) (among others) argues that humanitarian aid fuels conflict through co-optation by conflict parties, Anderson (1999) outlines a framework by which aid can avoid causing harm. Despite disagreement on the successes and failures of aid,  its outcomes remain critical to justify the existence and legitimacy of humanitarian space (Clouette & Wise, 2017, 7).

In sum, both the principles that bound humanitarian space and the operations within it are subject to debate, implying that its ‘nature’ remains in flux. Yet, two significant changes have shifted the trajectory of humanitarian space in recent years. 

Change 1: Boundary Permeability and the War in Gaza 

 Prior to the Syrian civil war, interference in humanitarian space had largely resulted from conflict parties lacking respect for humanitarian principles and      perceiving aid agencies as non-neutral. In the cases of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Iraq, and Afghanistan, for instance, some conflict parties saw aid workers as co-belligerents with intervening UN, NATO, or coalition forces, undermining the perceived neutrality of humanitarian space (Morris, 2004, 108; 118-119; Barnett, 2011, 192-193). Terry’s (2013) analysis of violence against healthcare systems in Afghanistan, Somalia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) also finds that the vast majority of incidents occurred due to disregard for the protected status of healthcare, rather than strategic targeting of humanitarian space (24).

The Syrian Civil War (2011-2024) marked a significant change towards the deliberate targeting of humanitarian space. Scott (2022) finds that “changes in the nature of threat [original emphasis]” had a significant impact on threat perception by international humanitarian workers (3). Aid workers noted three elements in particular: increasing everyday insecurity; threats of targeted humiliation and torture; and the perpetration of violence by norm-defiant armed groups (namely the Islamic State/ISIS) (Scott, 2022, 13-14). The hostility of the Assad government was particularly notable, as it placed severe restrictions on access to besieged or opposition-controlled areas (Ferris & Kirişci, 2016, 88-92). Yet, the perpetrators of interference in humanitarian space faced significant international pressure. Several states intervened militarily against ISIS, while the Assad regime faced withering Western sanctions and was suspended from the Arab League from 2011 to 2023 (Lindsay, 2023). 

Israel’s war in Gaza (2023-present) represents a drastic escalation in the extent of permeability when compared to the Syrian conflict. After the military takeover by Hamas in 2007, the Gaza Strip was already subject to a “land, sea and air blockade” by Israel, severely restricting the movement of Palestinian residents and the entry of essential goods and supplies (UN OCHA, 2022). In the aftermath of Hamas’ attacks on October 7, 2023, Israel unleashed a ground invasion of Gaza and restricted humanitarian access to an unprecedented extent. The number of aid trucks entering Gaza fell from 500-600 to around 50 per day, representing only 5% of pre-war supply (Al-Nabit, 2025, 609). Shortages of electricity and medical supplies also placed severe strain on healthcare systems. This occurred within a context of extreme aid dependency, with approximately 90% of Gaza’s population desperately requiring aid for food, water, and shelter (Al-Nabit, 2025, 609). 

The Israeli military also deliberately targeted humanitarian space to an unprecedented degree. Humanitarian actors operated in an environment of intense insecurity, with over 500 aid workers killed on the ground in Gaza (International Rescue Committee, 2025). Across 2023 and 2024, these included at least eight strikes on aid workers, convoys, and their locations      with no advance warning, even though aid groups provided their coordinates to Israeli forces (Human Rights Watch, 2024). The UN Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices cited the severity of this targeting as part of a pattern of practices “consistent with the characteristics of genocide” (UN General Assembly, 2024, 25/27).

Yet, Israel did not merely intervene within the physical boundaries of humanitarian space, but challenged its neutrality and political independence. This is most evident in the systematic undermining of the UN Refugee Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), an agency that plays a backbone role in providing humanitarian aid in Gaza and myriad services to displaced Palestinians across the region (UNGA, 2024, 25/27). Israel accused UNRWA staff of complicity in the October 7 attacks by Hamas, spurring both a UN review of the agency and temporary funding suspensions from 16 countries (including two major donors) (UNGA, 2024, 25/27). Although some concerns on the neutrality of UNRWA-provided aid had foundation, Israel proceeded to create the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF) with American support in order to bypass UNRWA and other international agencies, deliberately substituting humanitarian space for militarized control of aid delivery (OHCHR, 2025; Jabali et al., 2025). GHF aid distribution sites were marked by indiscriminate fire against civilians, creating an environment of mortal risk and a belief among Palestinian civilians that aid was no longer neutral, but rather a mechanism of control (OHCHR, 2025; Hamamra & Shehab, 2025, 8). Therefore, according to Hamamra and Shehab: “risk and violence are inherent to seeking humanitarian assistance” in Gaza (Hamamra & Shehab, 2025, 11).     

The most significant cause of the increased permeability of humanitarian space has been the relative impunity with which Israel has been able to interfere. Unlike non-state actors or ‘pariah’ states in other conflicts like Syria, Israel did not face significant economic or political costs for its blockades and targeting of humanitarian aid for the majority of the war in Gaza. Although Israel is facing increasing isolation from European nations including arms embargoes and targeted sanctions, many of these steps came in 2025 after almost two years of interference in humanitarian space (Kent, 2025).

Israel’s impunity is itself the consequence of two broader trends in international politics. The first is the weakening rules-based order, including the declining power of multilateral institutions. While the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has issued judgements calling for the “unhindered provision of aid at scale,” and despite International Criminal Court (ICC) arrest warrants for two Israeli leaders, questions of jurisdiction have meant that Israeli officials are yet to face significant consequences for their decisions (House of Commons Library, 2025, 6-8). The second is the increasing importance of geopolitical spheres of influence. The United States has traditionally used its UNSC veto to prevent criticism of Israel (O’Dell, 2023), but its direct involvement in GHF and increasing provision of military aid has cemented the priority of geopolitical interest over neutrality in Gaza’s humanitarian space. Israel’s interference in Gaza has therefore significantly increased the permeability of humanitarian space, undermining both its physical boundaries and its underlying principles of neutrality and independence. 

Change 2: Operational Strain and the Sudanese Civil War 

Humanitarian space has been subject to interventions to increase its efficiency, or its ability to achieve desired outcomes with available resources. A 2017 report for USAID by the consultancy Humanitarian Outcomes usefully disaggregates efficiency into technical (the speed and smoothness of aid delivery processes) and allocative efficiency (the appropriate allocation of resources to achieve specific outcomes) (Stoddard et al., 2017, 1). Donors and international humanitarian agencies have implemented internal metrics to evaluate the efficiency of both technical and allocative efficiency by enhancing professionalism, coordination (such as through the UN Cluster system), and accountability (Rose et al., 2013, 84-85; Van Rooyen, 2013, 14-15). Some scholars have criticised these steps for being overly technocratic and Western-centric at the expense of local realities, subsequently promoting localisation efforts across humanitarian agencies with mixed results (Sundberg, 2019, 253; Paffenholz et al., 2023).

Debates on the efficiency and impacts of humanitarian aid have previously                 occurred against the backdrop of a steady rise in funding and resources. This is no longer the case. According to the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance (ALNAP, 2025), funding in the humanitarian sector “is now in reverse gear” (2). While global humanitarian assistance funding peaked in 2022, 2024 saw a $5 billion funding drop, the largest reduction on record (ALNAP, 2025, 3). Moreover, predictions for 2025 predict a 34-45% decline compared to 2022 levels (ALNAP, 2025, 6). This decline coincides with rising humanitarian funding appeals and ongoing crises in Palestine, Ukraine, Yemen, and Sudan, among others. 

The reasons for the decline in funding differ across donors, but can generally be explained by domestic political antipathy and shifting budgetary priorities. In the United States, domestic political shifts have resulted in right-wing hostility towards humanitarian aid as ‘woke,’ driving the outright closure of USAID and the increasing politicisation and securitisation of aid within U.S. foreign policy (Mawdsley et al., 2025). Even sympathetic donors, such as the United Kingdom, have reduced aid funding due to post-COVID budgetary constraints in 2020 (from 0.7% to 0.5% of Gross National Income/GNI) and increased defence spending in 2025 (from 0.5% to 0.3% of GNI) (Loft & Brien, 2025a; 2025b).  

As a result, humanitarian actors have scrambled to maximise efficiency and reform operations with fewer resources at their disposal. In March 2025, UN Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) Tom Fletcher initiated the Humanitarian Reset to reform humanitarian space amid “a profound crisis of legitimacy, morale, and funding” (Fletcher, 2025). This reset involves a shift towards cash-transfer funding to local and national actors, simplifying coordination structures, pooling existing funding, and prioritising life-saving operations (Fletcher, 2025). International aid agencies now stress efficiency in their internal operations, while the bulk of funding cuts continue to impact local and national actors (ALNAP, 2025, 18). 

Funding reductions and efficiency pressures have resulted in significant strain on operations within humanitarian space, evidenced by the case of Sudan. On April 15, 2023, fighting broke out between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Khartoum, resulting in a civil war and mass atrocities across the country (Council on Foreign Relations, 2025). This has led to an unprecedented humanitarian crisis, with 9 million internally displaced persons (IDP) and over 30 million people in need of humanitarian assistance (UN OCHA, 2025). Existing funding, however, covers only 33.52% of the $4.2 billion required to address vital needs (UN OCHA, 2025).  

Funding reductions from the United States, previously Sudan’s largest aid donor, have directly constrained operations in Sudan’s humanitarian space. The closure of USAID cut a significant proportion of funding towards emergency kitchens, healthcare programmes, and essential medical supplies (Ferragamo, 2025). The UK’s Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI) also found that trust in UK humanitarian operations in Sudan has been negatively impacted by aid volatility and cuts (ICAI, 2025). Meanwhile, local actors have found it nearly impossible to continue delivering aid at scale. According to Adeela, a Sudanese non-governmental organization, of 200 emergency kitchens which previously served 176,000 individuals; only two remain operational (Adeela, 2025). Funding reductions have also been directly linked to increased attacks on aid workers (Stoddard et al., 2025).

This has meant that humanitarian space has been stretched to its limit as crises and atrocities expand across Sudan. On October 26, 2025, the RSF captured El-Fasher, the capital of North Darfur, triggering a mass exodus of civilians to surrounding regions amid reports of mass murder and rape by RSF forces (Mishra, 2025). This event, combined with civilians fleeing North Kordofan, have driven rising needs that cannot be met by the current extent of humanitarian operations, which are on the brink of collapse due to empty warehouses, attacks on convoys, and restricted access (International Organisation for Migration, 2025). In short, humanitarian space is too strained to meet rising humanitarian needs.

Future Trends and Implications 

Two questions arise from this discussion: Will these changes have long-term impacts; and what are their implications for the future of humanitarian space? Any answers to these questions are inherently speculative, yet crucial to understand how the nature of humanitarian space may continue to change in the long run. 

Overall, both changes to humanitarian space are likely to continue. With regard to boundary permeability, the root causes of Israel’s interference with impunity, namely geopolitical contestation and the weakening rules-based order, show no signs of arresting. The causes of operational strain are similarly unlikely to abate. Budgetary constraints and political antipathy towards aid among major donors remain robust, and even a sympathetic potential post-Trump U.S. government must contend with the steep costs of re-creating the decayed institutional frameworks and knowledge of USAID. 

This has important implications for the future of humanitarian space. First, it is possible that other countries follow Israel’s example in trespassing upon humanitarian space, although these countries may need a great power (ideally with UNSC veto power) to support them against the ire of UN organisations and the international community. Permanent members of the UN Security Council may continue to ignore the existence of humanitarian space altogether. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is a clear example, given the repeated targeting of hospitals and aid delivery infrastructure. Nevertheless, the Trump administration’s conduct in its ongoing conflict with Iran has also ignored humanitarian space, constantly shifting the boundaries for ‘legitimate’ areas of hostilities.  

Second, the space is likely to fragment further among myriad actors including increasingly politicised agencies, private-funded and philanthropic initiatives, regional actors like ASEAN and the African Union, and local efforts in order to manage operational strain (Van Rooyen, 2025; Barnett, 2025). This threatens the cohesion and neutrality of existing humanitarian space, potentially creating multiple competing humanitarian spaces if coordination mechanisms do not evolve in response. Finally, local actors will likely be forced to innovate and adapt in order to remain resilient to external interference and funding cuts, serving as the rear-guard for retreating humanitarian actors.

Conclusion 

The nature of humanitarian space has changed through increasing permeability of its boundaries and increasing strain on its operations. The reasons for these changes include a weakening rules-based order, geopolitical contestation, and internal political and funding constraints facing major donors. As these causes are likely to hold true for the foreseeable future, the conception of a neutral, independent humanitarian space focused on protecting the most vulnerable in complex emergencies is under existential threat. Whether the international community can muster a cohesive response, and whether local organisations can continue to meet the needs of the most vulnerable, are critical questions to be answered within the Conflict, Security, and Development conference.  

Reference List (Chicago Author-Date)

Active Learning Network of Accountability and Performance (ALNAP). 2025. Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2025. June 16. https://alnap.org/help-library/resources/global-humanitarian-assistance-gha-report-2025-e-report/

Adeela. 2025. “Aid Cuts in Sudan: An Update from Peacebuilders.” Peace Direct, September 9. https://www.peacedirect.org/sudan-aid-cuts/.

Al-Nabit, Nasser. 2025. “Undermining Humanitarian Space in Conflict Epicenters: The Gaza Strip from the 2006 Blockade to Post-October 2023 War.” Journal of Information Systems Engineering & Management 10 (17s): 605–619. https://doi.org/10.52783/jisem.v10i17s.2782

Anderson, Mary B. 1999. Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace—or War. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

Barber, Benjamin. 1997. “Feeding Refugees, or War? The Dilemma of Humanitarian Aid.” Foreign Affairs 76 (4): 8–14. https://doi.org/10.2307/20048117

Barnett, Michael, and Thomas G. Weiss. 2008. “Humanitarianism: A Brief History of the Present.” In Humanitarianism in Question: Politics, Power, Ethics, edited by Michael Barnett and Thomas G. Weiss, 1–48. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctt7v7ms.5

Barnett, Michael. 2011. Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctt7z8ns

Barnett, Michael. 2022. “Humanitarianism’s New Business Model.” Public Anthropologist 4: 233–259. https://doi.org/10.1163/25891715-bja10039.

Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). 2025. “Civil War in Sudan.” Centre for Preventative Action. Updated November 6. https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/power-struggle-sudan

Clouette, B., and M. Wise. 2017. Forms of Aid: Architectures of Humanitarian Space. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. DOI:10.1515/9783035608267.

Ferragamo, Mariel. 2025. “A Third Year of War: Dried-Up Aid Pulls Sudan Further Into Chaos.” Council on Foreign Relations, April 14. https://www.cfr.org/article/third-year-war-dried-aid-pulls-sudan-further-chaos.

Ferris, Elizabeth, and Kemal Kirişci. 2016. The Consequences of Chaos: Syria’s Humanitarian Crisis and the Failure to Protect. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7864/j.ctt1c2cqws

Fletcher, Tom. 2025. “The Humanitarian Reset: Message from Emergency Relief Coordinator Tom Fletcher to the Humanitarian Community.” UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), March 11. https://www.unocha.org/news/humanitarian-reset-10-march-2025

Hamamra, B., and E. Shehab. 2025. “Humanitarian Aid in Gaza: From Lifeline to Arena of Violence and Exclusion.” Third World Quarterly: 1–17. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2025.2576787

House of Commons Library. 2025. Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories in 2023–25: UN, ICC and ICJ Statements and Actions. January 13. https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-10131/CBP-10131.pdf

Human Rights Watch. 2024. “Gaza: Israelis Attacking Known Aid Worker Locations.” May 14. https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/05/14/gaza-israelis-attacking-known-aid-worker-locations

Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI). 2025. UK Aid to Sudan: A Review. October 15. https://icai.independent.gov.uk/review/uk-aid-to-sudan/review/

International Organization for Migration (IOM). 2025. “IOM Chief Warns of Imminent Catastrophe as Displacement Surges in North Darfur.” November 11. https://www.iom.int/news/iom-chief-warns-imminent-catastrophe-displacement-surges-north-darfur

International Rescue Committee. 2025. “Palestinians Make Up Almost One Fifth of Aid Workers Killed Since Records Began.” Press statement, August 18. https://www.rescue.org/uk/press-release/palestinians-make-almost-one-fifth-aid-workers-killed-records-began. 

Jabali, O., S. Jabali, and D. Haase. 2025. “Aid as a Weapon: The Gaza Humanitarian Foundation.” The Lancet 406 (10507): 1003–1004. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(25)01693-9

Keen, David. 2008. Complex Emergencies. Cambridge: Polity.

Kennedy, David. 2019. “Humanitarianism Governed: Rules, Identity, and Exclusion in Relief Work.” Humanity 10 (2): 207–237. https://doi.org/10.1353/hum.2019.0012.

Ker-Lindsay, James. 2023. “Is Syria No Longer a Pariah State?” World Politics Review, April 27. https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/syria-pariah-state/

Kent, Lauren. 2025. “From Diplomacy to Soccer, Israel Is Becoming a Pariah on the Global Stage.” CNN, September 28. https://edition.cnn.com/2025/09/28/middleeast/israel-isolation-culture-eurovision-intl

Loft, Philip, and Philip Brien. 2025a. “UK Aid: Spending Reductions Since 2020 and Outlook from 2024/25.” House of Commons Library, February 12. https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9224/

Loft, Philip, and Philip Brien. 2025b. “UK Aid: Reducing Spending to 0.3% of GNI by 2027/28.” House of Commons Library, October 29. https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-10243/

Mardini, Robert. 2021. “’Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict: Preserving Humanitarian Space’: Statement delivered by Mr. Robert Mardini, Director-General of the International Committee of the Red Cross, to the UN Security Council.” International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), July 16. https://www.icrc.org/en/document/humanitarian-space-must-be-protected-without-exception

Mawdsley, Emma, Glenn Banks, Chloe Sanyu, Regina Scheyvens, and John Overton. 2025. “Taking (Anti-)‘Woke’ Seriously: The Future of Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid.” Development Policy Review 43: e70031. https://doi.org/10.1111/dpr.70031

Mishra, Vibhu. 2025. “Mass Displacement, Trafficking Fears Deepen Crisis in Sudan’s El Fasher.” UN News, November 27. https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/11/1166465

Morris, Nicholas. 2004. “Humanitarian Intervention in the Balkans.” In Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations, edited by Jennifer M. Welsh. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/0199267219.003.0006

O’Dell, Hannah. 2023. “How the US Has Used Its Power in the UN to Support Israel for Decades.” Chicago Council on Global Affairs, December 18. https://globalaffairs.org/commentary-and-analysis/blogs/how-us-has-used-its-power-un-support-israel-decades

Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). 2025. “UN Experts Call for Immediate Dismantling of Gaza Humanitarian Foundation.” August 5. https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/08/un-experts-call-immediate-dismantling-gaza-humanitarian-foundation

Paffenholz, Thania, Philip Poppelreuter, and Nicholas Ross. 2023. “Toward a Third Local Turn: Identifying and Addressing Obstacles to Localization in Peacebuilding.” Negotiation Journal 39: 349–375. https://doi.org/10.1111/nejo.12444

Roberts, Adam. 1996. “Humanitarian Action in War: Aid, Protection, and Impartiality in a Policy Vacuum.” Adelphi Papers 36 (305). https://doi.org/10.1080/05679329608449384 

Rose, Emily K. M., Phil O’Keefe, Janaka Jayawickrama, and Geoff O’Brien. 2013. “The Challenge of Humanitarian Aid: An Overview.” Environmental Hazards 12 (1): 74–92. https://doi.org/10.1080/17477891.2012.742368

Scott, Emily K. M. 2022. “Compromising Aid to Protect International Staff.” Journal of Global Security Studies 7 (1). https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogab024

Stoddard, Abby, Lydia Poole, Glyn Taylor, Barnaby Willitts-King, Shoaib Jillani and Alan Potter 2017. Efficiency and Inefficiency in Humanitarian Financing. Report for US Agency for International Development (USAID) by Humanitarian Outcomes. https://humanitarianoutcomes.org/sites/default/files/publications/humanitarian_financing_efficiency_.pdf

Stoddard, Abby, Meriah-Jo Breckenridge, Monica Czwarno, and Mariana Duque-Diez. 2025. Aid Worker Security Report 2025. Humanitarian Outcomes. August. https://www.humanitarianoutcomes.org/AWSR_2025

Sundberg, Malin. 2019. “National Staff in Public Foreign Aid: Aid Localization in Practice.” Human Organization 78 (3): 253–263. https://doi.org/10.17730/0018-7259.78.3.253. 

Terry, Fiona. 2013. “Violence Against Health Care: Insights from Afghanistan, Somalia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.” International Review of the Red Cross 95 (889): 23–39. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1816383113000581

United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). 2024. Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices. September 20. https://docs.un.org/en/A/79/363

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA). 2022. Gaza Strip: The Humanitarian Impact of 15 Years of the Blockade. June. https://www.unicef.org/mena/media/18041/file/Factsheet_Gaza_Blockade_2022.pdf.pdf.

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA). 2025. “Sudan.” September. https://www.unocha.org/sudan

VanRooyen, Michael. 2013. “Effective Aid: Ensuring Accountability in Humanitarian Assistance.” Harvard International Review 35 (2): 12–16.

VanRooyen, Michael. 2025. “The Future of Humanitarian Aid: Navigating a Politicized and Fragmented Landscape.” Harvard Humanitarian Initiative. https://hhi.harvard.edu/news/2025/06/future-humanitarian-aid-navigating-politicized-and-fragmented-landscape