A view of a refugee camp with numerous tents in various colors, populated by people amid a mountainous landscape.

Source: CDC via Wikimedia Commons

For decades, governments, charitable bodies, and individual citizens have provided aid to conflict-stricken regions, with the hope that such aid can ameliorate the ‘human costs of war by providing relief to vulnerable populations’ (Wood, 2015). Humanitarian aid enables the provision of services to exceptionally vulnerable persons and mitigates the consequences of conflict by preventing many thousands of deaths by disease, starvation, and malnutrition. It is a core part of the international community’s response to conflict and continues to be essential in the protection of civilians during war. The study of the effectiveness of aid in conflict zones has been explored academically by notable researchers, including Apthorpe (2016) and Anderson (1999), who argue that, notwithstanding the unintended consequences, aid has been effective in providing stability in conflict-affected regions. Nevertheless, numerous reports suggest that humanitarian aid can be ineffective at best and act as a catalyst for violence at worst (Bryer & Cairns, 1997).  This essay examines the exploitation of humanitarian aid through processes of criminalisation. It analyses the case of Rwanda, where militia groups manipulated vulnerable aid camps to advance their own strategic objectives, illustrating how humanitarian resources can be co-opted by armed actors to sustain violence and prolong conflict. Furthermore, it draws comparative insights between refugee camps in Zaire and the misallocation of humanitarian assistance in Cambodian refugee camps in Thailand, highlighting recurring patterns in the misuse of aid across different contexts.

The negative consequences associated with the distribution of humanitarian aid have been thoroughly dissected in academia, with researchers such as Sullivan and Wood (2015) arguing that the provision of aid can be exploited by certain groups to intentionally undermine efforts to restore peace and to target innocent civilians to further their own violent objectives. Sullivan and Wood (2015) argue that ‘aid encourages rebel violence by providing opportunities for looting’ and can enable such groups to further their ambitions using aid as a ‘resource base.’ They argue that humanitarian aid prompts rebel violence in two ways:

  1. Firstly, the provision of aid prompts rebel violence as it encourages looting and predation. This can result in significant abuses against civilians for whom the aid was originally intended.
  2. Secondly, rebels often perceive humanitarian aid delivery as a mechanism to undermine and challenge their authority over local populations.

Rebels are often thought to be the weaker party in any conflict, and as a result, are under immense pressure to obtain resources. Humanitarian aid sites in regions of conflict, such as refugee camps, provide a ‘valuable target for rebels to replenish depleted resources or augment their capabilities’ (Johnson 2011). This problem is exacerbated when host states are not willing to ensure adequate security or do not have the capabilities to do so, which makes refugee camps exceptionally vulnerable to attacks from rebel groups. Elsewhere, Kalyvas (2006) argues that refugee camps, aid sites, and other similar provisions inadvertently offer refuge and ‘camouflage’ to rebels, by providing opportunities for insurgents to blend into the civilian population, which also ‘complicates the Government’s ability to distinguish between neutral civilians and militants.’ In addition, Lischer (2003) argues that not only does the prevalence of aid resources encourage looting by rebel forces, it also increases the risk of civilian abuse. He argues that previous studies draw close connections between violence against civilians and rebel reliance on illicit resource acquisition. In her book ‘Do No Harm,’ Mary Anderson (1999) provides further insight into the ways in which humanitarian aid is distributed ineffectively. She argues that although aid can be distributed successfully to save lives and promote development, too often it also ‘reinforces and prolongs conflict.’ Anderson (1999) provides a unique insight into the mismanagement of aid, sharing interviews with aid workers who describe how aid can be ‘misappropriated by warriors to support the war.’

Whilst the literature provides compelling insight into the prevalence of humanitarian aid exploitation, research conducted in Iraq by Berman, Shapiro, and Felter (2011) suggest that under certain conditions, aid can promote local security, suppress rebel activity, and ultimately reduce conflict, and that the presence of militia groups does not always result in the exploitation of humanitarian aid. In addition, although it appears that aid is consistently and systematically exploited, the repetitiveness of such abuses makes it possible for researchers to predict emerging trends and subsequently implement mechanisms to prevent such exploitation (Anderson, 1999). Anderson provides compelling examples illustrating how NGOs can employ innovative strategies to prevent militias from exploiting aid for profit, demonstrating that, although exploitation is widespread in conflict zones, there are effective measures to mitigate attempts to divert humanitarian resources. For instance, in Tajikistan, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) distributed building materials to assist communities in reconstructing their homes following the war. Aware that such resources are often targeted by thieves if left unattended, aid workers implemented same-day distribution, ensuring that recipients could access essential supplies promptly and securely (Anderson, 1999).

Elsewhere, aid workers in Chechnya demonstrated a keen understanding of the local community dynamics. They observed that aid agency vehicles traveling between communities were less likely to be targeted by thieves when elderly men from the community were seated prominently in the front. This precaution leveraged the perception that any hostile action against such vehicles would be seen as an affront to the elders’ clan, with swift reprisals likely to follow, which effectively outweigh any potential gains from theft (Anderson, 1999). These examples reflect remarkable ingenuity in aid distribution and illustrate strategies for ensuring that humanitarian resources are utilised effectively. Despite this, even in environments where aid is delivered effectively to its recipients, there are unintended and damaging consequences of creating a thriving aid ‘industry’ that ultimately feeds the war economy. This materialises in many ways, for example, aid agencies have previously unknowingly recruited directly from local militias when looking for guards to protect their goods and staff. Similarly, the influx of significant financial resources in the form of aid, enables locals to seek secure employment in the distribution of it- as long as the conflict persists. 

Quite often, when economies become so disrupted by war that few non war economic opportunities exist, individuals who benefit economically ‘develop a stake in the continuation of conflict’ (Anderson, 1999). Together, these dynamics illustrate how well-intentioned humanitarian assistance can inadvertently reinforce the structures of conflict it aims to alleviate. It can be contended that the perpetuation of war economies by aid providers is, to some extent, unavoidable due to the substantial resources required to deliver effective humanitarian assistance. Nonetheless, aid organisations should actively seek opportunities to develop local capacity by sourcing resources domestically and by enhancing the skills of locally employed aid workers, thereby enabling them to secure employment within peacetime economies. Such measures can “help reinforce peacetime systems and institutions” (Anderson, 1999).

It can also be argued that the true extent of ineffective humanitarian aid remains largely unknown, as aid agencies are often “compelled to present their activities in a positive light” in order to secure funding from the public and other sources (Terry, 1998). In doing so, they may be reluctant to disclose failures for fear that doing so could jeopardise future donations from skeptical donors. This consideration is critical for understanding what constitutes ‘ineffective humanitarian aid,’ particularly given evidence that some reported successes may be exaggerated to appease funding bodies. In his book, ‘Why Do We Lie About Aid,’ Yanguas (2018) develops this argument further, noting that even when humanitarian interventions are reported as successful, the true effectiveness is difficult to ascertain. NGOs operate in a competitive fundraising environment, and any public perception that aid is not being delivered effectively can have significant and damaging consequences for their fundraising efforts.

THE CASE OF RWANDA

Some of the largest refugee camps ever established include those established in the Great Lakes region of Africa, during the genocide perpetrated against the Rwandan Tutsi minority. In April 1994, an estimated 170,000 Rwandan refugees, the majority of whom were Hutus, began migrating to Tanzania. Amongst the refugees were prominent Hutu leaders who were local orchestrators of the genocide against the Tutsis and who subsequently sought refuge in camps. They were reported to have exploited the humanitarian aid made available to them (Bradol and Le Pape, 2024). Members of the FAR (Rwandan Armed Forces), who led the genocide against the Tutsi, saw the emerging refugee camps as an opportunity to find shelter, food, and protection ‘against those who might punish or retaliate against the FAR for genocide’ (Lepora & Goodin, 2013). In this example, humanitarian aid was successful in the establishment of such camps, but enabled organisations such as FAR to perpetuate war crimes by manipulating civilians for war purposes, and ultimately using them as human shields. They were able to instigate propaganda, misleading Hutu civilians to believe they would be persecuted if they attempted to return to Rwanda. The 1994 cholera epidemic acted as a catalyst for Hutu militias attempting to capitalise on the protection provided by refugee camps as an influx of humanitarian actors inadvertently strengthened the political and military power of the FAR. This enabled FAR, and other perpetrators, to take leadership of several refugee camps, and in doing so, provided an ecosystem in which they were able to divert aid, use camps as military recruitment centres and kill opponents with little opposition (Halvorsen, 2017).  In the case of Rwanda, Rwandan refugees spent two years living in refugee camps controlled by Hutu militias. Barber (1997) argues such militias rely on the goodwill of humanitarian workers and foreign aid donors to inadvertently fund the group’s illicit activity. Whilst in the camps, Hutu militiamen initiated attacks across the border against Rwanda’s new Tutsi-led Government. When Zairian Tutsis set out to dismantle the refugee camps in an attempt to take over Zaire, more than 500,000 of the inmates declined to follow the militias into Zaire and chose instead to return to Rwanda, telling local media they had been held hostage for two years (Barber, 1997).

In understanding the role of humanitarian aid as a catalyst for the perpetration of violence by militia groups, we must also critically explore other contributing factors that enable and legitimise such violence. In doing so, we can dissect the relative role of humanitarian aid in the prolonging of conflict, and deepen our understanding of whether the consequences of ineffective aid implementation is compounded by other contributing factors. A primary example of this is the role of governments. The Zairean Government has previously been accused of being instrumental in the ‘legitimisation, protection and material support of the FAR/Hutu leadership’ (Lepora & Goodin, 2013). They enabled perpetrators of the genocide to cross its borders with heavy artillery and other weapons unchallenged, and actively facilitated their economic transactions with other states who provided them with additional artillery to embolden their illicit activity. The Zairean Government also consistently ignored international calls for the arrest of war criminals (Terry, 1998). Terry (1998) also argues that aid agencies cannot be held responsible for the militarisation of refugee camps, because it was ‘neither their task nor within their capacity to ensure the civilian character of the camps.’ However, humanitarian organisations were aware of the military manipulation of the camps, and also aware they were providing the material support that enabled actors such as FAR to thrive. Ultimately, when faced with ‘the moral dilemma of indiscriminately providing aid to all and inadvertently fuelling violence’ (Shue &Wippman 2001), or withholding aid and prolonging the suffering of civilians, aid workers from Doctors Without Borders and the International Rescue Committee retreated.  The atrocities perpetrated by Hutu militias, even as humanitarian aid continued to flow into the camps, placed aid organisations in a profound ethical dilemma: whether to persist in providing assistance, thereby potentially reinforcing the power of genocidal actors, or to dismantle the camps, leaving a population in urgent need without essential support (Lepora & Goodin, 2013). Despite tackling this moral dilemma, and ultimately retreating as to do no further harm in the country, they were almost immediately replaced by another NGO to administer similar food distribution campaigns and to maintain the refugee camps. They were hired by UN officials, demonstrating that international institutions are not always able to implement lessons learnt in the delivery of aid programmes (Halvorsen, 2017). In addition, the role of the media as a means to diffuse and reinforce Hutu propaganda has also exacerbated the impacts of ineffective humanitarian aid. Journalists at some radio stations, including Radio Milles Collines, were said to have cooperated with the FAR’s leadership and provided them with a platform from which to continue to spread misinformation (Kellow & Steeves, 1998). These examples demonstrate how organisational decisions, institutional constraints, and the manipulative role of the media collectively influence the effectiveness of humanitarian aid.

THE CASE OF CAMBODIA

In the midst of the 1978-91 conflict in Cambodia, the US and other states provided resources and funding to establish refugee camps in Thailand. From October 1979 to January 1980, Thailand introduced an “open-door” policy for Cambodians, which allowed them to enter the country without restriction and to receive temporary asylum until they resettled or chose to return to Cambodia (Helton, 1989). In the case of Cambodia, the use of humanitarian aid money to establish and maintain refugee camps had such negative implications, that academics such as Robinson (2000) concluded that the ‘Humanitarian aid program on the border served both to provoke conflict and to relieve its victims,’ and that the Cambodian border camps ‘at the same time fostered refuge and prolonged the need for it.’ Similarly to refugee camps established in Zaire for Rwandan refugees, the refugee communities that sought refuge in camps were not a typically passive collection of dependent refugees, but instead represent ‘highly conscious’ refugee communities with a hierarchy fuelled by political objectives who thrived as recipients of essential humanitarian aid (Terry, 2002).  In addition, the camps also contained armed sections that engaged in warfare and used the refugee camps as a resource base upon which it fuelled its activities. The warriors who live amongst refugees, were able to develop a sophisticated international refugee regime that forced civilian populations to live in exile for years. The militarisation of refugee camps became so prevalent, that aid workers delivering resources to the camp at the time described food distribution and supply of medical services as ‘precarious and often dangerous’ (Jenne, 2017). In the case of Cambodian refugees in Thailand, various contributing factors aside from the prevalence of aid, catalysed the misfortune of vulnerable refugees. Specifically, the refugees themselves were not provided with protective refugee status once in Thailand, and were classed as ‘illegal immigrants’ and therefore were not afforded the protections that would apply to typical refugees. This was exacerbated from the military threats they faced by a number of different sources, including the Thai military and paramilitary forces, aided by a UN agency with no explicit mandate of any kind. This demonstrates that without the effective cooperation of the host country, it is difficult to implement humanitarian aid effectively. Despite the flaws associated with humanitarian aid delivery in Thailand, Stephen Heder (1980) compellingly summarises the crisis, concluding that had it not been for humanitarian aid provisions, despite its imperfections, “the Vietnamese probably would have succeeded in literally starving Democratic Kampuchea to death by the end of 1979.” Demonstrating that even in the ineffective delivery of humanitarian aid in challenging circumstances, it is still an essential resource in the protection of civilians.

CONCLUSION

The premise of this article is to demonstrate that humanitarian aid has been exploited by a number of groups who continue to act in their own interest, and in doing so undermine the vast efforts by aid workers to stabilise areas of conflict. This prolongs conflict and undermines donor trust in the effectiveness of their donations. The vast literature on the study of humanitarian aid effectiveness concludes that the prevalence of humanitarian aid can be a catalyst for good, for preventing deaths, empowering communities, and rebuilding war torn communities. However, it must be acknowledged that despite the perceived benefits of humanitarian aid provision, the consistent, strategic, and determined effort by militia groups to exploit aid, extort refugees, and profit from aid demonstrates there must be a converted effort to implement humanitarian aid innovatively to mitigate these effects. It is also important to acknowledge other contributing factors in the ineffective distribution of aid, including the role of governments, paramilitary groups, and the media who have collectively undermined this effort as illustrated in the refugee camps established in Zaire and Thailand. Ultimately, even when humanitarian aid is delivered effectively, the inadvertent negative impacts of fuelling the war economy demonstrate that organisations must look to more sustainable methods of aid delivery, including by sourcing aid locally and training locally sourced aid workers in ways that will enable them to seek employment in peacetime economies.

Bibliography: 

Anderson, M.B., 1999. Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace or War. Lynne Rienner.

Apthorpe, Raymond. 2016. “Effective aid: The poetics of some aid workers’ angles on how humanitarian aid ‘works’.” In The Personal and the Professional in Aid Work, pp. 159-173. Routledge.

Berman, E., Shapiro, J.N. and Felter, J.H., 2011. Can hearts and minds be bought? The economics of counterinsurgency in Iraq. Journal of political Economy, 119(4), pp. 766-819.

Bradol, J.-H. and Le Pape, M. (2024) Humanitarian aid, genocide and mass killings. Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) CRASH. Available at: https://msf-crash.org/sites/default/files/2024-04/9781784993054_book.pdf 

Bryer, D. and Cairns, E., 1997. For better? For worse? Humanitarian aid in conflict. Development in Practice, 7(4), pp.363-374.

Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A., 2002. Aid, policy and peace: Reducing the risks of civil conflict. Defence and Peace Economics, 13(6), pp. 435-450.

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Jenne, N., 2017. The Thai–Cambodian border dispute: an agency-centred perspective on the management of interstate conflict. Contemporary Southeast Asia, pp. 315-347.

Johnson, R.A., 2011. Refugee camp security: decreasing vulnerability through demographic controls. Journal of Refugee Studies, 24(1), pp.23-46.

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Yanguas, P., 2018. Why we lie about aid: Development and the messy politics of change. Bloomsbury Publishing.

Samaira Saleem
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Samaira is an MA student in Conflict, Security and Development at King’s College London, with research interests in conflict prevention, transitional justice, and the role of humanitarian aid in mitigating and managing crises in conflict-affected regions. Alongside her studies, she serves as a civil servant in the UK Ministry of Defence, contributing to the development and implementation of international policy.

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SAMAIRA SALEEM


Samaira is an MA student in Conflict, Security and Development at King’s College London, with research interests in conflict prevention, transitional justice, and the role of humanitarian aid in mitigating and managing crises in conflict-affected regions. Alongside her studies, she serves as a civil servant in the UK Ministry of Defence, contributing to the development and implementation of international policy.