Source: 2021 Swastik Arora via Unsplash

As the burden of development provision shifts away from multilateral assistance and increasingly falls directly upon the governments of developing countries, a transition towards politicised redistributive instruments such as national cash transfer programmes (CTPs) as new primary providers of development funding is taking place. In developing country contexts, CTPs are simple and widespread mechanisms used by governments to respond to voter demands for redistribution, human capital development and poverty alleviation. The most significant structural distinction between cash transfer programmes is conditionality, where recipients of funds from conditional programmes are only eligible to receive said funds after performing actions meeting specific criteria, often for the purpose of affecting behaviours to better achieve human development objectives (UNICEF, 2016). 

Due to the political nature of national CTPs, it is possible to use political economy models to investigate the determinants behind structural distinctions of conditionality between CTPs. The primary political economy model for understanding the electoral determinants and subsequent implementation of redistributive policy by governments is the Median Voter Theory of Redistribution (MVTR). This theory states that governments respond to the median income voter as the decisive determinant of their redistributive policy (Meltzer and Richard, 1981). In practice, the income of the median voter is most often lower than the mean income, and this inequality causes a higher level of redistribution to be demanded of the government by the decisive voter (Meltzer and Richard, 1981). Redistribution consists of government allocation of funds gained through revenue-gathering instruments such as taxation, towards improving socio-economic outcomes of poorer populations, defined for our purposes as those below the mean income level (Luebker, 2012).

Investigating the determinants of differentiation in conditionality structures in CTPs using political economy could aid in the identification of potential blind spots in national redistribution and development provision as development aid funding is being redefined in form, purpose and motivation, becoming increasingly ‘locally’ owned and directed by national governments rather than the international community. This paper compares two structurally distinct national CTPs implemented and expanded in 2007-2010 by elected governments in developing countries. Specifically, the Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (4P), a conditional cash transfer programme (CCTP) in the Philippines, and the Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP), an unconditional cash transfer programme (UCTP) in Pakistan. After briefly detailing the demand-side median voter call-to-action for these programmes, I will evaluate whether the governments are responding to these demands or are instead subject to alternate determinants of redistributive behaviour, specifically institutional path dependency and elite interests. I will conclude that while the 4P programme was expanded due to median voter demands, BISP’s implementation was primarily motivated by elite interests for use as a targeted political patronage instrument. Finally, I will reflect on the comparability of these case studies based on the institutional and socioeconomic history of each country’s contexts, determining that competitive elections and institutional transparency are the broad determinants of government responsiveness to median voter redistribution demands.

Case 1: Philippines and Conditional Cash Transfers

The 4P Programme, first implemented in 2007 by the Arroyo government and then greatly expanded from 2010 onwards by the newly elected Aquino government, is a CCTP with the primary purpose of providing social assistance through monetary support to poor families and promoting socially developmental behaviour by conditioning receipt of aid on children’s enrolment in education (DSWD, 2024). The expansion of the 4P programme was both a key electoral promise and a policy move intended to aid in fulfilling the broader priority of nation-wide poverty eradication (Cerda, 2014) (PCO, 2016).

The median voter demographic in the Philippines is poor and lower-middle income households, particularly those with children. This is evidenced by a broad range of demographic statistics. Beginning with age, Table 1, found in Annex 1, shows that nearly half of the registered voting population is below 35 (Holmes, 2016, p. 24). These voters are more likely to either have children of school age or be in the school age demographic themselves (5 to 24 years old), which comprises 41.8% of the total national population (NSO, 2013). Regarding socio-economic status, a significant proportion of the Filipino population live below the poverty line, with a national poverty incidence rate of 26.5% in 2009, shown by Figure 1 in Annex 2. Disaggregation of the voting population based on socio-economic classification distributes the population into economic classifications of A through E. Of interest to us are classes E and D, defined as ‘poor’ and ‘low-income but not poor’ respectively (Sorita, 2022). According to surveys conducted by Pulse Asia Research Inc., class D constitutes around 65-75% of the registered voting population, with Class E containing around 20-30% (Holmes, 2016, p. 24). These two categories together represent the young, poor households, which, as we have established, were the Aquino government’s median voter demographic. Importantly, their key socio-economic challenge is keeping their children in school. 16% of Filipino children were Out of School Youths (OSYs) in 2010, and Tables 2 and 3 show that the high cost of education was cited as the primary cause, with over half of OSYs coming from families in the bottom 3 per capita income deciles. This is reinforced by polling which found that education and economy were the top policy issues for a majority of voters in the 2010 election (CMFR, 2010).

The Filipino median voter demanded redistribution with a focus on educational outcomes, and the Aquino government responded strongly, firstly through electoral promises, and subsequently through policy after its ‘landslide’ election win (Hedman, 2010). Expansions of 4P in terms of budget, population and territorial coverage were all undertaken to fulfil these goals. From its pilot year in 2007, the programme grew in budget from ₱4 million ($78,000) and 6000 household beneficiaries to ₱89.4 billion ($1.7 billion) in 2018 and a peak of 4.4 million households in 2014 (Figure 2 and 3) (Acosta, Avalos, and Zapanta, 2019, pp. 1-4). The programme’s expansion targeted median voters both socio-economically and territorially as can be seen when comparing overlaps of poverty incidence and 4P household coverage rates in Figures 4 and 5. The programme also consistently covered around 60% of the ‘poor’ population reference group and allocated less than 75% of benefits to the bottom 2 income quintiles between 2013-2015 (Figure 6 and 7).

4P’s targeted redistribution has produced significant results in line with median voter demands for poverty alleviation and educational outcome improvement. Firstly, according to government data, 4.2 million 4P household beneficiaries have improved their status from poor to ‘non-poor’, for a total of 7.7 million Filipinos lifted out of poverty (Politiko, 2016). Furthermore, 2016 SocialWeatherStations (SWS) surveys showed the lowest annual average self-rated poverty rate since 1987, part of a steady decline in self-rated poverty over 9 consecutive quarters (Gavilan, 2016) (SWS via ABS-CBN, 2017). Moving on to educational outcomes, World Bank analysis demonstrates that 4P had positive impacts on educational outcomes, increasing gross enrolment rates for 12-17 year old children by 5% and encouraging peripheral educational spending, with recipient households spending more on child clothing, footwear, and other expenses associated with school attendance and positively correlated with high school completion (Acosta, Avalos, and Zapanta, 2019, p. 11). Finally, the simultaneous effectiveness and responsiveness of the Aquino government’s 4P CCTP to median voter demands is reinforced by public support for programme, with a February 2016 SWS poll finding 80% of voters stated they “would probably vote for a candidate who will advocate the ‘Continuation of the 4Ps Program’” (SWS, 2016). 

Overall, the supply-side government action of 4P expansion into the 3^rd largest CCTP in the world was a direct response to the demand-side redistributive pressures of the median Filipino voter, as evidenced by the specific “targeting [of] residents of the poorest municipalities” and structural commitment to achieving key voter-demanded socioeconomic outcomes of educational development through the conditionality structures of the programme (Figure 8) (DSWD, 2024).

Counterclaim: Path Dependency as Determinant

A potential challenge to the claim that the Aquino government was responding to median voter demands for redistribution through its expansion of the 4P programme is that 4P was expanded due to institutional path dependency. This counter has some merit, as 4P is unusual in the fact that its initial pilot was designed and implemented by the previous Arroyo administration in 2007-09 before being expanded by the Aquino government. Policymakers are indeed restricted by path dependency from making broad structural changes to policy. 

However, the determinant impact of path dependency on policy structure is not uniform. Hall’s seminal work on path dependency paradigms divides policy changes within path dependent paradigms into three levels: “change in the level of policy instruments (first order); change in the instruments actually used (second order change); and change in the overall policy paradigm (third order change which occurs at the policy system level)” (Hall in Kay, 2005, p. 557). This allows for determining “whether an existing policy is changing or whether a new policy is being introduced” (Kay, 2005, p. 557). Furthermore, Hall’s paradigm explicitly allows for new “experience and… knowledge” to be the primary determinants of ‘instrument setting’ changes in cases where “the overall goals and instruments of [the] policy remain the same” (Hall, 1993, p. 278). The expansion of 4P fits into the first and lowest order of Hall’s paradigm, as it did not change the instrumental structure of conditionality previously established by the Arroyo pilot programme, merely scaling it up through beneficiary and budgetary expansion (Figure 2 and 3), thus remaining within the boundaries of a first-order change. The Aquino government’s new knowledge gained through their election win of the median voter’s demand for redistribution is still the primary cause for their response, with institutional path dependency merely restricting their available responses such that expanding the 4P CCTP was the option with the highest returns (Pierson, 2000).

Case 2: Pakistan and Unconditional Cash Transfers

Pakistan’s BISP programme was established at almost exactly the same time as 4P by the newly elected Pakistan People’s Party (PPP). It consisted of unconditional cash transfers for the purpose of reducing adverse impacts of food and fuel inflation on the poor, its most significant differences from 4P being the lack of behavioural conditions attached to the grants, and parliamentarians selecting the eligibility of households to receive grants (Mumtaz and Whiteford, 2017, p.21). This distinction and the behaviours it enabled are key to proving the contrasting motivation behind the BISP programme when compared to the fulfilment of median voter demands seen in 4P. As in many developing countries, high inflation and cost of living were a key median voter issue in the 2008 election in Pakistan (Gazdar, 2011) (Nelson, 2009). Polling of demand for government aid and redistribution in Table 4 shows financial assistance as a primary reason for contact with a local representative, especially for women, who are “especially vulnerable to poverty” (Mohiuddin, 1990, p.759).

Despite women’s higher relative economic vulnerability and thus motivation to demand redistribution, Pakistani women have significantly lower electoral participation and median voter demographics are male-dominated (Behan and Khatwani, 2024, p.141). For the few women who do vote, their proportional predisposition to poverty vulnerability due to male economic dominance allows men to serve as “gatekeepers” who determine women’s voting behaviour (Cheema et al., 2022; Anees, 2023). This same poverty vulnerability, poor domestic bargaining positions, and lack of mobility makes women especially receptive to clientelist redistributive policies influencing their electoral decision-making (Ijaz, 2018). Thus, the targeting of women by BISP does not fit with a median voter redistributive demand response, instead revealing an opportunity for political patronage strategies. Polling of BISP beneficiaries in the Sanghar district revealed that the grants serve as a “lifeline,” with 85.4% of respondents agreeing that BISP has enabled women to cast her choice of vote (Graph 9). Additionally, the same BISP beneficiaries “revealed that they used to vote against PPP in previous elections… [but] changed their mind and casted votes in favour of PPP as they were providing them with the BISP [grants]” (Behan and Khatwani, 2024, p. 146). Importantly, a 2011-2016 Difference in Difference model empirically observed that the intentional targeting of women by the “clientelistic party machinery” of BISP led to “improvements in… women’s [overall] participation in voting,” while simultaneously pushing them towards voting for PPP through patronage of their non-median voter demands (Ijaz, 2018, p. 3; Iqbal, Padda, and Farooq, 2020, p. 401). This targeted redistribution towards women as non-median voters for the purpose of political patronage has had measurable impacts on PPP electoral outcomes, seen in Figure 10, where PPP victories in the Sanghar district increased dramatically in post-BISP elections. Therefore, when considered with previous evidence of BISP targeted women’s increased voting preferences for PPP, these wins can be attributed at least in part to the patronage-enabling design structures of the BISP programme. 

There is widespread qualitative and empirical evidence that the structure of BISP’s redistribution mechanisms was not in line with median voter demands. Eligibility for grant reception was solely determined by personal selection of recipients by government representatives such as Members of National or Provincial Assemblies, who expressed significant political bias through their selections (Ghauri, Gishkori, and Khan in Waqas and Torre, 2020). OLS regression analysis conducted by Saleem “confirmed the substantial role played by political factors in explaining… variation in the distribution of BISP forms… In particular, the presence of an incumbent politician residing in a locality played a substantial and statistically significant role in explaining variation” (Saleem, 2019, p. 91). Incumbent politicians used BISP mechanisms as tools of patronage, favouring “their own constituencies/localities” by supplying them “with [on average] 410 more BISP forms as compared to localities without incumbent politicians” (Saleem, 2019, p. 91). Clearly, incumbent (PPP) politicians use their power and influence to allocate resources to the localities where they reside as part of political patronage schemes, while ignoring the normative considerations of efficiency and equity that would be priorities if the true primary motivation behind BISP was effective redistribution to address median voter demands (Saleem, 2019, p. 84, 141). By oversupplying redistribution towards their own localities at the expense of others, political elites encouraged beneficiaries to feel indebted to the ruling PPP party for financial assistance, influencing their electoral behaviour for their own benefit (Besley et al. in Saleem, 2019, p. 89).

Overall, BISP’s unconditionality and process of grant eligibility selection by PPP parliamentarians, combined with its specific targeting of women as a demographic group receptive to clientelist pressures, indicate that the primary motivator of this redistribution policy is not responding to median voter demands, but carrying out political patronage to fulfil the interests of political elites connected to the PPP party. Specifically, these interests are ensuring continued election victories for incumbent PPP politicians.

Comparison

To explain the divergence in outcomes between the median voter responsiveness of 4P and the political patronage of BISP, I have determined two necessary conditions for median voter demands for redistribution to translate into a complementary government response. The first of these conditions, which both the Philippines and Pakistan meet, is the existence of a competitive electoral system through which voters can communicate their demands (Bower, 2010) (EUEOMP, 2008). Where the case studies diverge is the second condition: sufficient institutional transparency, which ensures that the programmes utilise objective selection mechanisms and contain conditionality structures that ensure redistribution is directed towards achieving voter-demanded outcomes instead of being misdirected. The stronger democratic institutions of the Philippines ensured the most electorally advantageous policy position for the Aquino government to take was to respond to median voter demands for redistribution policy focused on educational development (EIU 2010). The path dependency of the 4P expansion process reinforces this, as diverging from the continuity of the existing Arroyo-era programme structure would be both electorally unpopular and institutionally difficult. The contrasting status of Pakistan in 2008 as a democratically transitioning hybrid government meant that though competitive electoral systems did exist, the embeddedness of elite interests within policymaking structures prevented median voter demands from taking precedence as the primary determinant of redistribution policy targeting (Rizvi and Khalid, 2017). These shortcomings in institutional transparency allowed elite interests of PPP incumbents to shape BISP into a political patronage instrument, as targeting the median voter was less advantageous than targeting female populations more receptive to clientelist pressures.

Conclusion

The Philippines and Pakistan are developing countries with competitive electoral systems that instituted large redistributive government programmes near simultaneously, making them good comparisons for analysing the impact of median voter demands on government redistribution policy. The Filipino median voter was poor/low-income, young or with young children, and demanded redistribution with emphasis on educational outcome improvements, while the Pakistani median voter was poor/low-income, male, and demanded redistribution with inflation and cost of living as their primary concern. The Aquino government’s expansion of the 4P CCTP, though directed by path dependency, was primarily motivated by responding to median voter demands, to great success and public acclaim. By comparison, the BISP UCTP’s politicised eligibility selection mechanism and electorally-motivated targeting of women shows its intended use as a tool of patronage politics for PPP elites. This shows that although democracy is definitionally essential for median voter demands to be heard, it is not sufficient to ensure that governments respond to median voter demands for redistribution. In addition to competitive elections, institutional transparency is necessary for governments to respond to median voter demands for redistribution. This second condition prevents competing policy determinants from outweighing median voter demands, increasing the responsiveness of governments in bringing about redistribution policies focused on achieving voter-demanded outcomes. 

Overall, this paper has analysed the case studies of the 4P CCTP and the BISP UCTP, determined the median voter demographic of the respective governments that implemented each policy, and debated whether each policy was responding to said voter’s redistribution demands, or subject to alternate determinants of government policymaking behaviour. It then used these conclusions to synthesise two conditions necessary for government policy to respond to median voter demands for redistribution: competitive elections and institutional transparency.

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Annex 1: Tables

Table 1: Registered Voters by Age, Philippines Commission on Elections 2015

Age Group	Number	%
18–19	3,043,411	5.60
20–24	7,983,167	14.68
25–29	7,370,037	13.56
30–34	6,333,398	11.65
35–39	5,764,839	10.60
40–44	5,100,591	9.38
45–49	4,680,698	8.61
50–54	4,025,439	7.40
55–59	3,367,013	6.19
60–64	2,596,255	4.78
65–Above	4,098,996	7.54

Source: Holmes, R.D. (2016) ‘The Dark Side of Electoralism: Opinion Polls and Voting in the 2016 Philippine Presidential Election’, Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 35(3), p. 24. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/186810341603500302.

Table 2: Percent Distribution of OSYs, by Per Capita Income Decile and Sex: Philippines 2010

Region	Total	Male	Female
Number of OSYs (‘000)	6,065	2,809	3,257
Percent	100	100	100
First Decile	20.6	21.8	19.6
Second Decile	17.8	18.8	16.9
Third Decile	14.5	14.5	14.5
Fourth Decile	12.3	11.6	12.9
Fifth Decile	10.4	9.5	11.1
Sixth Decile	9.0	8.9	9.0
Seventh Decile	6.7	6.3	7.1
Eighth Decile	4.6	4.3	4.9
Ninth Decile	2.8	3.0	2.7
Tenth Decile	1.3	1.3	1.2

Note: In ascending value of the family per capita income, families are grouped into per capita income deciles. The first decile represents the poorest families

Source: ‘Percent Distribution of OSYs, by Per Capita Income Decile and Sex: Philippines 2010’ (2011). Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA). Available at: https://psa.gov.ph/system/files/iesd/PRAPIS2011-83TAB2.pdf.

Table 3: Percentage Distribution of OSYs by Reason for Not Attending School, Age Group and Sex: Philippines 2010

Source: ‘Percentage Distribution of OSYs by Reason for Not Attending School, Age Group and Sex: Philippines 2010’ (2011). Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA). Available at: https://psa.gov.ph/system/files/iesd/PRAPIS2011-83TAB3.pdf.

Table 4: Reasons why citizens contact a union councillor in Pakistan

	Males	Females
Financial support	12	27
Water problem	17	15
ID card/certificates	17	14
Roads/streets	13	6
Electricity	10	8
Sewage/drains	8	7
Community dispute	6	5
Property land	3	4
Police issues	3	3
Garbage	4	2

Source: Hasnain, Z. (2005) The Politics of Service Delivery in Pakistan: Political Parties and the Incentives for Patronage 1988-1999. SASPR-6. The World Bank Group. p. 16. Available at: https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/108281468058153091/pdf/328780PAPER0PAK0Politics0SASPR6.pdf.

Annex 2: Graphs and Images

Figure 1: 2009 Official Philippines Poverty Statistics Presentation by National Statistical Coordination Board – Slide 8: National Poverty Incidence Rate

Source: Virola, R.A. (2011) ‘2009 Official Poverty Statistics – National Statistical Coordination Board’. NSCB Operations Room, Makati City, 8 February. Slide no. 8. Available at: https://web.archive.org/web/20220125092601/https://www.focusonpoverty.org/download/data/2009%20Poverty%20Statistics%20%28NSCB%29.pdf 

Figure 2: Cumulative Number of Registered 4P Beneficiary Households 2007-2018

Source: Acosta, P., Avalos, J. and Zapanta, A. (2019) Pantawid Pamilya 2017 Assessment. World Bank, Washington, DC (Social Protection Policy Note, No. 18). p. 2. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1596/32510.

Figure 3: Budget Appropriated on Pantawid Pamilya 2007-2017

Source: Acosta, P., Avalos, J. and Zapanta, A. (2019) Pantawid Pamilya 2017 Assessment. World Bank, Washington, DC (Social Protection Policy Note, No. 18). p. 5. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1596/32510.

Figure 4 and Figure 5: Poverty Map by City/Municipality, Region 8, 2009 and Region 8 Households under 4P, 2014

Source (Figure 4): Paran, E.M. (2012) ‘Poverty Map by City/Municipality, Region 8, 2009’, The Samar Monitor: Silvino Lobos is poorest municipality in Eastern Visayas, 12 August. Available at: https://samarmonitor.wordpress.com/2012/08/12/silvino-lobos-is-poorest-municipality-in-eastern-visayas/.

Source (Figure 5): ‘Philippines: Region 8 Households under 4Ps (as of 3 Jan 2014)’ (2014). United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). Available at: https://www.unocha.org/publications/map/philippines/philippines-region-6-households-under-4ps-3-jan-2014.

Figure 6: 4P Programme Coverage (% of the population within a referenced group)

Source: Acosta, P., Avalos, J. and Zapanta, A. (2019) Pantawid Pamilya 2017 Assessment. World Bank, Washington, DC (Social Protection Policy Note, No. 18). p. 6. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1596/32510.

Figure 7: Distribution of 4P benefits by Income Group

Source: Acosta, P., Avalos, J. and Zapanta, A. (2019) Pantawid Pamilya 2017 Assessment. World Bank, Washington, DC (Social Protection Policy Note, No. 18). p. 9. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1596/32510.

Figure 8: 4P Coverage (% of total population)

Source: Acosta, P., Avalos, J. and Zapanta, A. (2019) Pantawid Pamilya 2017 Assessment. World Bank, Washington, DC (Social Protection Policy Note, No. 18). p. 2. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1596/32510.

Figure 9: Polling Data for Question – “I think BISP has enable women to vote of her choice in Sanghar District”

Source: Behan, R.A. and Khatwani, M.K. (2024) ‘Impact of Benazir Income Support Program (BISP) on Voting Behavior of Women in District Sanghar’, Journal of Education and Social Studies, 5(3), p. 147. Available at: https://doi.org/10.52223/jess.2024.5316.

Figure 10: Distribution of Parliamentary Seats won in District Sanghar, Pakistan, by party

Source: Behan, R.A. and Khatwani, M.K. (2024) ‘Impact of Benazir Income Support Program (BISP) on Voting Behavior of Women in District Sanghar’, Journal of Education and Social Studies, 5(3), p. 143. Available at: https://doi.org/10.52223/jess.2024.5316.