
Introduction
The Cameroon conflict, also known as the Anglophone Crisis, refers to the armed conflict that has persisted since 2017 between the French-speaking Cameroonian state, (culturally considered Francophone)s and English-speaking separatist movements (Anglophones), in the North-West and South-West regions (Awasom 1998). The immediate triggers were lawyers’ and teachers’ strikes in 2016 protesting the erosion of Anglophone legal and educational systems, which rapidly escalated into an insurgency marked by widespread repression, displacement, and human rights abuses by the state (Anchimbe 2018).
Existing explanations by historians and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) such as Ezemenaka and Ekumaoko (2022) and the U.S. Committee for Refugees and Asylum Seekers (2025) commonly point to colonial legacies as a primary contributing factor of the conflict. Cameroon’s distinctive colonial trajectory, from German rule in 1884-1916 to partition between Britain and France post-WWI, produced divergent legal, administrative, and political institutions that persisted after independence. Although these differences clearly matter, treating colonial legacies as static or deterministic obscures the timing and escalation of the crisis. Colonial history alone cannot explain why violence erupted more than five decades after reunification, nor why long-standing grievances escalated into armed conflict rather than remaining within the realm of political contention. However, with the conflict being between two former European colonies, colonial legacies such as judicial systems remained and were sources of conflict.
This essay argues that colonial legacies have indirectly influenced the Anglophone Crisis not as fixed causes, but through post-unification governance choices such as the centralisation of the Francophone government, which progressively eroded institutional pluralism. While colonial legacies shaped both state structure and identity formation, the conflict emerged when the post-colonial Cameroonian state dismantled the federal and legal arrangements that had previously managed difference. Centralisation, shaped by French colonial administrative norms, transformed historical institutional diversity into perceived political exclusion of the Anglophone community, closing avenues for redress and enabling violent mobilisation.
I employ a theoretical framework of historical institutionalism to explain this indirect causal link between Cameroon’s colonial legacies and the escalation of violence in 2017. This theory posits that political outcomes are best understood by tracing how institutions emerge in specific historical contexts, structuring behaviour and creating path-dependent effects (Steinmo 2008). In Cameroon, this is seen through the governmental policies that over time eroded Anglophone institutions via centralisation, leading to an Anglophone call for secessionism.
The essay will begin by establishing the contrasting colonial institutional legacies of British and French Cameroon and demonstrate why post-colonial cultural difference alone did not necessitate conflict. I then examine post-unification federalism as a fragile but effective mechanism for containing tensions. Following, I offer the core analysis, showing how post- unification centralisation by the Francophone-led government politically activated colonial legacies, leading to an outbreak of violence. Finally, I consider some issues with the over-reliance on colonial legacies as an explanation for the conflict. Ultimately, I conclude that historical grievances of the Anglophone community reaffirm my central claim that the colonial legacies both for the Francophones and Anglophones remain an important, though indirect, contribution to the conflict.
Colonial Institutional Legacies of Britain and France
By the time of independence in 1961, Cameroon had inherited two distinct systems of governance, including two official languages of English and French in the respective post- colonial regions of the new federal state (Achimbe 2018). In the Anglophone region of former British Southern Cameroon, colonial administration followed a model of indirect rule (Enonchong 2020). Authority was exercised through local institutions with relatively limited bureaucratic penetration, reinforcing traditions of decentralised governance. The legal system was anchored in English common law, characterised by judicial precedent, adversarial proceedings, and professional autonomy among lawyers and judges (Enonchong 2020). Education and administration similarly emphasised local discretion, producing expectations of institutional pluralism and participation. The federation allowed the Anglophone community to maintain their policies in the education and legal systems.
French Cameroon, previously the République du Cameroun, by contrast, was governed through a highly centralised bureaucratic model rooted in assimilationist ideology. French colonial rule privileged legal uniformity and civil law, embedding political legitimacy in hierarchical administration and central control (Enonchong 2020). Governance was exercised top-down, with limited tolerance for regional or institutional variation (Awasom 1998). This system of government remained strongly influenced by French colonial systems of governance due to the reluctant attitude of the French toward decolonisation of strategic footholds in Africa.
At the same time, Cameroon was eager to gain independence swiftly, and thus hurriedly adopted constitutional models based on those of its European colonisers, ultimately adopting a repackaged version of the French Fifth Republic (Mbaku 1998). Independence of the French colony was ultimately achieved in exchange for enduring political and economic cooperation with France (Martin 1985). Consequently, French colonial influence did not truly end with Cameroonian independence in 1961; instead, it evolved into a neo-colonial framework of sustained dominance (Martin 1985).
The adoption of the colonial languages as the official languages of each region deepened the post-colonial cultural divide between the Anglophone and Francophone regions of Cameroon. This linguistic divide played a central role in the fortification of social identities, such that some historians, such as Hans Georg-Wolf, claim Anglophone and Francophone communities respectively became ‘quasi-ethnic groups’ (Wolf 2001 via Anchimbe 2018). Although this did not cause an outbreak of violence, it did create an environment in which government policy that was favourable to one side could be considered more than a mere political issue, but an existential one. Historical institutionalism would recognise this as a key contributing factor in the long-term path to the future conflict. Yet initially, the management of these differences on an institutional level was promising with the adoption of a federation model upon Cameroon’s reunification.
Reunification and the Federal Settlement
The post-independence settlement following reunification in 1961 initially demonstrated that colonial legacies could, in theory, be managed peacefully and that they did not necessitate outbreaks of violence. British Southern Cameroon, which had voted to unite with Cameroon over Nigeria at a UN-facilitated plebiscite, became the Western state, and the République became the Eastern state (Nkwi 2020). To ensure both Anglophones and Francophones could
maintain their respective cultural and political differences, Cameroon adopted a federal system explicitly designed to accommodate institutional pluralism. As Awasom (1998) notes, Anglophone elites accepted reunification largely on the assumption that federal safeguards would protect their institutional autonomy to avoid marginalisation and cultural dominance of Francophones. In principle, this offered a viable framework for coexistence by allowing Anglophone regions to retain key features of their colonial heritage, including common law courts, English-language education, and regional administrative structures (Enonchong 2020). Comparable federal arrangements elsewhere in Africa have demonstrated similar stabilising effects; Nigeria’s post-1970 federal system, for instance, has played a significant role in containing internal disorder within a deeply multiethnic polity (Suberu 2009).
Although federalism formally recognised two equal states in 1972, the Francophone-led République du Cameroun asserted disproportionate political and institutional dominance under Former President Ahmadou Ahidjo, blurring the lines between the two states from the start, and steadily eroding Anglophone autonomy (Mbaku 1998). This was evident in Article 59 of the Federal Constitution, which outlined that although it will be published in French and English, only the French text will be binding. Moreover, the adoption of the French Colonies Françaises d’Afrique (CFA) franc as the federal currency gave a significant economic advantage to East Cameroon (Enonchong 2020). In essence, the federation was, as Mbaku (1998) contends, federal in name only. The centralisation process was therefore realised long before its formalisation, and the long-term commitment to a federal model was a missed opportunity from the start, with its dissolution transforming managed differences into a source of enduring conflict.
This period demonstrates that although federalism did not eliminate the post-colonial legacy of power imbalances, it was able to manage it to some degree. Despite these deep institutional and cultural differences, colonial legacies alone did not produce violent conflict. Historical institutionalism helps explain why these colonial differences persisted without producing immediate conflict. British and French governance models created divergent institutional expectations, but these remained politically dormant so long as post-colonial arrangements, namely the model of federalism, preserved pluralism. Institutional difference alone is therefore insufficient to generate conflict. It becomes destabilising only when political mechanisms for managing diversity are removed or repurposed. In the case of Cameroon, this was seen by the dissolution of the federal system and centralisation of the Francophone government.
Centralisation and the Political Activation of Colonial Legacies
The most decisive factor linking colonial legacies to conflict was the slow process of centralisation. The abolition of federalism in 1972 marked a structural turning point, dismantling the institutional architecture that had protected Anglophone autonomy. This reflects what Mahoney and Thelen (2010) would describe as a combination of institutional displacement and institutional conversion. Institutional displacement sees the ‘breakdown of institutions with new ones’ that can occur slowly over time (Mahoney & Thelen 2010, 16). However, in the case of Cameroon this did not happen in the context of a revolution, hence the simultaneous reflection of institutional conversion. Conversion sees an exploitation of existing institutional models (such as the Francophone systems) whereby there is an assumption of power and political dominance to ‘orchestrate a shift from within’ (Mahoney & Thelen 2010, 18). This process preserved the appearance of national unity while substantively eroding Anglophone autonomy, delaying overt conflict while deepening grievances. Constitutional changes were implemented within the legal, educational and governmental sectors to solidify the centralist policy of the Francophone government to such an extent that Anglophones saw them as ‘breathing down their neck’ (Nfah-Abbenyi 2020, 187).
A key mechanism of centralisation in the legal institutions was the creation of the École Nationale d’Administration et de Magistrature (ENAM), or, National School of Administration and Magistry, which became the exclusive training ground for magistrates in Cameroon, immersing them almost entirely in Francophone civil law procedure rather than Anglophone common law (Enonchong 2020). This administrative centralisation created dysfunction and asymmetry within the judicial system. Anglophone lawyers faced Francophone magistrates posted in Anglophone communities who were unfamiliar with the judicial system of English common law. Moreover, many ENAM graduates could not conduct proceedings in English, instead relying on French legal texts and dismissing the relevance of case law common in the Anglophone legal system (Enonchong 2020). The creation of ENAM thus cemented a Francophone civil law orientation as the normative standard for the national judiciary. This process did not erase the colonial legal divide but politicised it, converting institutional difference into a structure of perceived discrimination that perpetuated Anglophone political grievances.
Such changes were similarly evident in the educational institutions. The East and West states of Cameroon had continued to uphold the distinct educational systems of France and Britain, respectively. However, there was continued effort by President Paul Biya to standardise the French Baccalaureate in place of the British General Certificate of Education (GCE), which was defended by the Anglophones (Enonchong 2020). This was further actualised through the posting of Francophone teachers in Anglophone schools who knew little English and were not familiar with the British education system (Achimbe 2018). Thus, Anglophone schools ceased to be environments for cultural survival and instead became absorbed by the Francophone educational model. In 1983, students of the University of Yaounde protested government attempts to introduce a solely French curriculum (Konings & Nyamnjoh 2003). Again, policies transforming the Anglophone education system to adopt that of the Francophone were considered by the Anglophone community a threat to the survival of their cultural heritage. Assimilation to the Francophone system was perceived not as administrative reform but through a neo-colonial lens (Konings & Nyamnjoh, 2003), reinforcing the Anglophone feeling of intentional marginalisation (Pommerolle & Heungoup 2017).
Perhaps the most profound change under centralisation came later in 1984, twelve years after the dissolution of the federation. President Biya unconstitutionally reverted the country’s name from the United Republic of Cameroon to its pre-reunification title, the Republic of Cameroon (Anyefru 2011). This new name was deeply symbolic in its rejection of federalism. It represented the dismissal of the existence of two distinct states within Cameroon, absorbing West Cameroon (Anglophones) into a single entity aligned to East Cameroonian Francophone identity. To the Anglophone community this did not represent administrative streamlining but a symbolic erasure of their community’s recognition. As noted by Kaufman (2001), symbolism, including group representation in name, can be a driving factor of ethnic war when these symbols are eradicated or threatened. This solidified previous centralisation policies seen in legal and educational institutions as absorption rather than unification.
Linking back to Georg-Wolf’s analysis of Francophone and Anglophone communities as quasi-ethnic groups, this form of centralisation carries deeper symbolic meaning than mere political domination. To the Anglophone community, this process of centralisation was a direct threat to their identity as a distinct cultural group. Marginalisation by the Francophone government mirrored historical episodes of colonisation by German and then British powers. As such, historians such as Konings & Nyamnjoh (2003) and Taylor (2019) analyse Francophone centralisation as a form of neo-colonialism.
These are examples of historical institutionalism, whereby gradual governmental, legal and educational assimilation fundamentally disrupts federalist autonomy whilst avoiding immediate conflict. The institutional changes can be traced back to colonial origins rather than independent nationalism (Anchimbe 2018). As argued by historian Awasom (1998), post-colonial autonomist movements such as that of the Anglophones are not stand-alone events but are in fact a natural response from a people with a long history of threatened nationhood, whose nostalgia for sovereignty resurfaces whenever they feel marginalised. As historical institutionalism would explain, the Anglophone response was actualised by the institutional decisions, namely, the dismantlement of federalism. Ultimately, this indicates that colonial legacies provided the context from which later conflict could emerge, but their causal force depended entirely on post-colonial governance choices. Centralisation thus transformed historical difference into political inequality, activating grievances that had previously remained constrained.
Conflict Escalation in 2017
The escalation of conflict from peaceful protests in 2016 to an outbreak of violence in 2017 was the final stage of the political activation process, where state repression removed the final avenues to political alignment between the two communities. It illustrates how such centralisation of the Francophone political elite translated Anglophone grievance into violent secessionism. This transition was not inevitable but driven by a specific sequence of repressive responses from the Francophone government that eroded alternative channels of diplomatic resolution. Within a historical institutionalist framework, the escalation after 2017 represents the point at which institutional erosion became state repression, transforming long-standing grievances into violent mobilisation.
Initially, lawyers’ and teachers’ strikes were acts of institutional preservation, not an articulation of secessionist demands. They protested the deliberate marginalisation of the Anglophone common law and education systems, which were a direct consequence of the centralisation policy. Where Anglophones once had institutional avenues for redress under federalism, centralisation had rendered such channels ineffective. For example, the These peaceful demonstrations were met with violent methods of dispersal from the government, such as tear gas, guns, and arrests (Beseng, Crawford, & Annan, 2023). As Pommerolle and Heungoup (2017) note, ideological as well as physical suppression of the Anglophone movement was important in weakening its support. With nationalism at the centre of Francophone discourse, ideological rejection of Anglophone autonomy by intellectuals further denied the legitimacy of Anglophone grievances, silencing dialogue before it could begin.
The state escalated strategic repression beyond protest disruption by closing schools, cutting off internet access, and targeting the community rather than protesters (Pommerolle & Heungoup 2017; Nfah-Abbenyi 2020). This signalled to Anglophone communities that reform was no longer possible within existing structures, proving to be a critical catalyst in the radicalisation of separatist groups that followed. Although these protests were initially a call for a return to federalism, state suppression of the peaceful demonstration quickly pushed Anglophone attitudes towards a secessionist goal. The separatists now fought for an independent Republic of Ambazonia, where Anglophones could live free of Francophone institutions and policy (Beseng, Crawford, & Annan, 2023). In 2017, on the anniversary of Southern Cameroon’s independence from Britain, the Anglophone separatist groups officially declared independence. This was again met with violence from the government, comprising military occupation in Anglophone areas and a declaration of war by President Biya on the separatist groups (Beseng, Crawford, & Annan, 2023). This illustrates that, while colonial legacies created the fault lines of identity and grievance, the immediate cause of escalation came down to government decision making. Colonial legacies may have shaped the meanings attached to exclusion, but escalation was driven by institutional repression.
Limitations of Historical Institutionalism
Before concluding, it is worth noting the limitations of historical institutionalism as an analytical model of the Cameroon conflict. These include a risk of overemphasising path dependency and a deterministic attitude towards institutional choices. In other words, there are other factors to consider in the lead up to a war than government policy alone. For example, geographical factors were a major source of Anglophone marginalisation. The British and French colonies of Cameroon were unequal players from the start. British Cameroon was just one fifth of the inherited territory of Cameroon, ultimately leading to the Francophone majority and Anglophone minority (Awasom 1998). This geographical asymmetry would inform future political and economic asymmetry. Therefore, the unequal partition of the former German colony undermines the primary importance of institutional decision-making in the repression of the Anglophone minority.
However, this does not negate institutional change as a mobilising factor in the lead up to the conflict. And this is the crux of historical institutionalism: that the conflict was a direct result of institutional erosion that held significance within the historical colonial context within which it emerged. Geographical asymmetry highlights the role of institutional change via centralisation as a catalyst rather than a cause of conflict, which historical institutionalism supports.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the Cameroon conflict cannot be solely attributed to colonial legacies, but these have played an indirect and significant role in shaping the conditions that led to violence. The contrasting colonial experiences under British indirect rule and French centralised governance created deep institutional and cultural divides, which persisted post independence. While the initial federal system seemed to offer a peaceful solution for managing these differences, it was ultimately dismantled by centralisation policies that undermined Anglophone autonomy. This centralisation, rooted in French colonial administrative norms, transformed historical pluralism into a perception of political exclusion, creating fertile ground for secessionist movements and an outbreak of violence.
Through the lens of historical institutionalism, the conflict can be understood as a product of political choices made by government elites that reinforced historical inequalities. The escalation of violence in 2017, triggered by state repression of peaceful protests, exemplifies this. Ultimately, while colonial legacies shaped the identities and institutional structures in Cameroon, the immediate causes of conflict were governance decisions that systematically dismantled the mechanisms for managing ethnic and linguistic diversity. Thus, the Cameroon conflict highlights the relationship between colonial history and post-colonial political decisions, with institutional decision-making being a direct mobilising factor of indirect historical and colonial dynamics that together determined the path to conflict.
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Sylvie Livingstone
Sylvie is a current student at King’s College London on the MA Conflict Resolution in Divided Societies program. She completed her undergraduate degree in Philosophy from University College London. Alongside her studies she is a caseworker for the Centre for Action for Refugees and Asylum Seekers. Her academic focus surrounds the implications of religion in international negotiation as well as post-conflict displacement and immigration policy.
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