Introduction

The question of whether humanitarian relief aid has done more harm than good has been a topic of extensive debate in academia. The correlation between conflict and humanitarian aid is undeniably complex and multifaceted. In the modern world, aid has become a preferred Western response to conflict, state failure, and mass displacement.^[i] In recent years, demand for humanitarian assistance has increased as the number of people affected by conflict has risen dramatically (e.g., Syria, Gaza, Lebanon, Afghanistan, Ukraine). The figures for forced displacement have grown from 43 million in 2010 to 123 million in 2024, the highest number recorded by the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR).^[ii]

While humanitarian assistance is intended to alleviate human suffering and promote peace, it has been accused of having the paradoxical effect of inadvertently sustaining the very conflicts that it seeks to mitigate. As Mary Anderson argues, aid can unintentionally support war economies, empower belligerents, and deepen divisions within conflict-affected societies. The central idea of her “Do No Harm” framework is that humanitarian assistance, despite being well-intentioned, may become part of the local political economy and therefore cannot be entirely neutral. Under certain conditions, aid resources such as food, shelter, and medicine may be diverted, taxed, or controlled by armed groups, thereby strengthening their capabilities to wage war.^[iii] In this sense, humanitarian operations risk legitimising and sustaining conflict actors rather than contributing to mitigating harm. However, focusing solely on these distortions risks overlooking the fundamental purpose and impact of humanitarian relief, which is the protection of civilian life. The success or failure of an aid intervention should be judged not by whether it influences the policies of warring parties, but by whether it effectively reaches those in need. Critics of aid diversion often neglect the most obvious question: how many lives were saved because humanitarian actors were present amidst the conflict, negotiating access, and delivering essential assistance regardless of political manipulations and operational constraints?

In this essay, I argue that humanitarian relief aid does not inherently fuel conflict. Rather, its impact is shaped by the broader political environment which can impose constraints under which humanitarian agencies operate. Beginning by defining key concepts and examining existing scholarly perspectives on the subject, I then demonstrate that imperfect aid should not be considered harmful, as in many conflicts, aid has served as the only barrier between civilians and catastrophic mortality. I analyse these dynamics through the case studies of Bosnia (1992-1995) and Chechnya (1994-2004). Bosnia shows how quasi-state armed groups sought to manipulate humanitarian aid during the Yugoslav wars, whereas in Chechnya, the Russian state used control over humanitarian access and displacement management for political coercion throughout the Chechen wars. Taken together, these cases reveal patterns of aid manipulation, and the strategic use of humanitarian narratives by state (or quasi-state) actors; however, without the humanitarian interventions, civilian casualties of war and displacement would have been far greater. Ultimately, the essay argues that, despite its imperfections and the challenges it faces in conflict settings, humanitarian relief aid remains fundamentally protective.

Theoretical Framework

Humanitarian relief aid can be defined as action taken to alleviate suffering during conflict and in the immediate aftermath of war and natural disasters. As articulated by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the delivery of aid in conflict settings should be guided by the key principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and independence.^[iv] In this sense, aid has strong mitigating effects, such as reducing human suffering and mortality, providing essential resources and medical care, and enabling survival under vulnerable conditions. During conflict, state resources are often shifted towards military activities; therefore, humanitarian aid becomes essential and is provided by the international community as a life-saving intervention.

Humanitarian aid in civil wars has been frequently portrayed as a powerful force that can shape conflict outcomes. Since the 1990s, scholars and practitioners, such as Anderson, Barnet & Weiss, and Duffield, have widely recognised that aid may not always be politically neutral in practice and can unintentionally prolong war, exacerbate violence, empower and support the interests of armed actors, or reinforce coercive strategies.^[v] William Easterly argues that the West’s efforts to aid the developing world have done “so much ill and so little good”.^[vi] Rose et al. similarly emphasise the dilemmas associated with delivering humanitarian relief, noting that humanitarian action operates in complex environments where moral imperatives to save lives frequently clash with political realities. When poorly coordinated or politically manipulated, aid can deepen dependency and prolong instability rather than resolving humanitarian crises.^[vii] While striving for neutrality, the interventions undertaken by aid organisations may reshape local dynamics and even create incentives for continued conflict. However, it is important to remember that aid is not intended to address the root causes of conflict, but rather to meet the basic needs of the most vulnerable populations amidst conflict – needs that are often neglected in wartime.

Moreover, Anderson highlights that aid transfers resources such as food, shelter, logistics, and legitimacy, which can shape the political economy of conflict. By outlining strategies to minimise the negative effects aid may have, she is hinting at the possibility of aid being manipulated by the warring parties to produce desirable outcomes.^[viii] In situations where armed actors control territory or population movements, humanitarian operations risk reinforcing violence. In this regard, aid may become a source of funding for warring parties. It can be appropriated directly, taxed by armed actors, or diverted through corrupt networks, thereby becoming a fixed part of the war economy and strengthening military capabilities, as seen in Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).^[ix]

Although these dynamics are mainly associated with rebel-controlled territories, they can also apply to state actors who take control over distribution channels. Aid can also be weaponized by taking control over humanitarian access for the purposes of rewarding loyalty or punishing opposition, or coercing population movements.^[x] While navigating these challenges, some armed actors, both formal and informal, have exploited humanitarian resources to advance their military and political objectives. When armed groups hold military power, aid may become entangled with the local political economy. For these reasons, the aims of humanitarian interventions should remain clearly separate from the objectives of armed actors seeking control in every way possible. This underscores that attributing conflict escalation primarily to aid diversion overstates the role that humanitarian assistance actually plays.  As Shearer contends, the economic value of other commodities known to fuel conflict, such as minerals, hardwoods, and drugs, far exceeds that of aid. This is visible in the case of the UNITA faction in Angola, which earned roughly $500 million USD annually from diamonds.^[xi]

Another significant illustration of the potential unintended effects of humanitarian relief aid concerns displaced populations whose vulnerabilities increase dramatically during conflict. Lischer explores how large-scale displacement can create opportunities for armed actors to militarise displacement and refugee or internally displaced population (IDP) camps, exploit them for recruitment, intelligence, or political leverage.^[xii] Roberts further examines the evolution of humanitarian relief operations in the post-Cold War era, arguing that modern aid often operates in a “policy vacuum,” which makes it more vulnerable to manipulation by warring parties. He suggests that humanitarian action should be mandated clearly, with stronger coordination with political actors and greater awareness of how aid interacts with conflict dynamics, while at the same time safeguarding core humanitarian principles.^[xiii]

Despite the side effects discussed above, there is little correlation between aid volumes and the duration or intensity of wars. While it may be somewhat valuable to analyse the discourse on the detrimental effects of humanitarian aid, they must be assessed in light of empirical evidence. Data and reports from the field enable a more balanced evaluation, showing no systematic link between aid levels and conflict outcomes. Many people survive armed conflict precisely because of the assistance provided by the international community. The case studies of Bosnia and Chechnya-Ingushetia offer important empirical support for this claim.

Case Study: Bosnia

The Bosnian War, which began in 1992 following Yugoslavia’s disintegration, remains one of the most notable examples of the challenges related to humanitarian intervention, civilian protection, and political exploitation of aid during armed conflicts. The conflict arose after the breakup of the former Yugoslavia, with rising national movements among Bosniaks, Bosnian Serbs, and Bosnian Croats competing over territorial claims.^[xiv] The subsequent violence was characterised by widespread ethnic cleansing primarily targeting Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks, along with intense fighting, destruction, systematic sexual violence, and the displacement of nearly 2,7 million people.^[xv] Among the most brutal episodes were the nearly four-year siege of Sarajevo (the longest in modern European history) and the 1995 Srebrenica genocide, in which more than 8,000 Bosniak males were executed despite the town’s designation as a “UN safe area.”^[xvi]

From the onset of the conflict, the international community, including the United Nations (UN) and later NATO forces, was closely involved in humanitarian operations across Bosnia. Over the course of the war, they delivered 950,000 tonnes of food, medicine, and supplies in total to besieged civilian populations, making it the world’s largest humanitarian operation. This assistance undeniably helped sustain hundreds of thousands of people over several years and prevent the collapse of besieged populations.

The United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), the organization’s peacekeeping force in Bosnia and Croatia, was mandated to assist in the effective aid delivery, yet the obstruction of humanitarian access became a central feature of wartime strategy. Until the Bosniak-Croat peace agreement of February 1994, aid distribution in Bosnia became part of a wider geopolitical struggle, where competing actors exploited aid channels to strengthen their control.^[xvii] Aid convoys were blocked, redirected, or taxed by warring factions who sought to leverage relief supplies to secure political concessions or reinforce their military objectives.^[xviii] Western strategies that tied humanitarian access to political negotiations heightened civilian vulnerability and created the perception that aid was partial and politicised. As Morris contends, while aid safeguarded the population and kept civilians alive, it also allowed belligerents to continue the siege without bearing the humanitarian consequences of their actions, enabling the war to continue.^[xix] All major parties to the conflict came to view humanitarian operations as directly benefiting their opponents and allowing the resistance to continue. For these actors, aid was seen not as a neutral assistance but as an obstacle to achieving territorial and strategic goals, reinforcing the perception that humanitarian intervention was extending the duration of the conflict.^[xx]

With the problem redefined as humanitarian, the political foundations of the conflict remained untouched. By easing the civilian suffering, aid also reduced pressure on the warring parties, allowing them to continue fighting without bearing economic or social costs.^[xxi] International humanitarian agencies, including the ICRC, played an important role in negotiating access for humanitarian supplies with the warring parties and managed to deliver essential assistance against all odds. Aid overwhelmingly reached civilians and helped prevent mass starvation, especially in besieged areas such as Sarajevo, Srebrenica, Tuzla, and Goražde, where relief operations kept populations alive for years. Between 1992 and 1996, UNHCR coordinated the longest-running humanitarian airlift in history, delivering 160,000 tonnes of food, medicines, and other supplies to Sarajevo in over 12,000 flights, and evacuating more than 1,100 war casualties.^[xxii] Moreover, the proportion of civilian casualties was relatively low, reaching roughly 40,000 people out of 110,000 in total.^[xxiii]

Even though the humanitarian operation had many shortcomings, including constant obstruction from the warring parties, internal tensions and divisions, as well as a lack of clear policies, the fact that these organisations were able to deliver almost a million tonnes of food, medical supplies, and other needed items amidst conflict was itself a major achievement. Even flawed or limited aid significantly reduced mortality by maintaining basic survival conditions. The absence of aid in the besieged areas would have turned the conflict into a humanitarian catastrophe.

Case Study: Chechnya

In December 1994, three years after Chechnya declared independence, Russian troops entered the territory in an attempt “to restore the constitutional order” in the region, thus marking the beginning of the First Chechen War (1994-1996).^[xxiv] What began as a political struggle for independent Chechen statehood soon became one of the bloodiest conflicts in the post-Soviet space, with Russian military campaigns killing an estimated 50,000 civilians. The war generated economic collapse in Chechnya and severely destabilised neighbouring Ingushetia, which received more than 500,000 refugees and experienced dramatic declines in agricultural output and state capacity. By 1997, both republics were among the poorest regions in the North Caucasus.^[xxv]

While the First Chechen War claimed more lives, the Second (1999-2009) was characterised by extreme levels of brutality and systematic targeting of civilians.^[xxvi] An estimated 30,000-40,000 Chechen civilians died during the conflict, hundreds of thousands were wounded, and over 270,000 people fled to neighbouring regions.^[xxvii] Together, the two Chechen wars generated one of the largest internal displacement crises witnessed in post-Soviet history.^[xxviii]

The scale of suffering and the extent of destruction made the humanitarian operations exceptionally challenging. Humanitarian agencies, including UNHCR, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and the ICRC, established camps and relief operations on the territory, providing food, shelter, medical care, and education. Between 1999 and 2007, the European Commission allocated nearly €240 million in humanitarian aid for various basic needs. The UN, ICRC, and World Food Programme (WFP) similarly provided large-scale support, reaching hundreds of thousands of beneficiaries within Chechnya. The Russian federal government also launched a reconstruction plan, although heavy bureaucracy prevented many civilians from receiving the full benefits from this assistance.^[xxix]

Despite the scale of assistance, humanitarian operations took place in an environment where Russian authorities tightly controlled access, frequently denying organisations      permission to enter conflict zones under the pretext of security concerns. This allowed the state to determine who received aid and under what conditions, enabling selective and politically motivated distribution. Lack of security and restricted access to victims remained key challenges for aid organisations, which faced operational risks, restricted movement, and administrative pressure.^[xxx] By 2002-2003, the centralised government began closing IDP camps across Ingushetia, pressuring displaced Chechens to return despite unsafe conditions.^[xxxi] Human Rights Watch documented threats, withdrawal of food aid, and cuts to heating and electricity, showcasing that aid was being used as leverage to force repatriation.^[xxxii] However, these dynamics reflect state coercion and manipulation, not the humanitarian system itself fueling more conflict. The presence of aid agencies played a major role in preventing a catastrophic famine, disease outbreaks, and the collapse of basic survival conditions in overcrowded camps. Even when manipulated and politicised, relief efforts consistently reduced civilian mortality and enabled the survival of displaced populations.

The Chechen wars, therefore, illustrate a context in which a sovereign state used humanitarian assistance and displacement management as tools of political control and coercion. Yet, they also showcase that the harmful consequences associated with humanitarian aid did not stem from the aid itself, but rather from the deliberate manipulation of relief operations by state actors. Despite these challenges, humanitarian agencies played an indispensable role in preserving civilian life amid one of the most destructive conflicts in post-Soviet history.

Conclusion

While humanitarian relief aid is aimed at saving lives, it is rarely isolated from the conflict environment. A critical assessment of the case studies of Chechnya and Bosnia further illustrates the profound complexity of humanitarian action, including how global power structures and local belligerents can shape the delivery, access, and impact of aid. In Bosnia, the war was characterised by a deeply fragmented political and social landscape, which meant that the context in which humanitarian agencies had to operate was extremely hostile, with each warring party perceiving aid as benefiting its opponents. On the other hand, the Chechen conflicts occurred in a highly centralised environment, where aid was used as leverage to reinforce federal authority and compel returns. Across both contexts, however, the core pattern is consistent: humanitarian aid played a vital role in reducing mortality, sustaining displaced populations, and treating the humanitarian consequences of the war, despite its imperfections.

Through this essay, I have demonstrated that in both Bosnia and Chechnya, aid agencies had to operate under severe constraints imposed by armed groups, yet their actions and provided resources mitigated rather than exacerbated the effects of violence. Aid overwhelmingly benefited civilians, who were the most exposed to harm, lacked military capacity, and were unable to access basic means of survival. It is undeniable that without international aid, both conflicts would have seen significantly higher civilian casualties and displacement levels.

Ultimately, the actions of aid actors address only the symptoms, not the root causes of violent conflict, such as political grievances, power struggles, or illicit economies. Food, shelter, and medical care cannot solve the factors that drive wars. Often, the failures of relief operations lie primarily in political manipulations, limited access, and lack of international political will, rather than in the nature or intent of humanitarian assistance itself. Thus, while aid may at times complicate the objectives of belligerents, solutions remain ultimately political, a fact frequently forgotten in the fog and frustration of armed conflict. By critiquing actions undertaken by aid agencies, the critics risk overstating the impact of relief aid and diverting attention from forces far more significant in sustaining and prolonging war

Endnotes

[i] Barnet & Weiss, 2008.

[ii] UNHCR Global Trends Report 2010 & 2024.

[iii] Anderson, 1999, pp. 67-79.

[iv] ICRC definition of humanitarian aid, International Humanitarian Law (the Fourth Geneva Convention, 1949).

[v] Anderson, 1999; Barnet & Weiss, 2008; Duffield, 2001.

[vi] Easterly, 2006, pp. 3-33.

[vii] Rose et al., 2013, pp. 74-92.

[viii] Anderson, 1999, pp. 67-79.

[ix] Macrae, 2001.

[x] Barnet & Weiss, 2008.

[xi] Shearer in Berdal & Malone, 2000, p. 196.

[xii] Lischer, 2005, pp. 1-15.

[xiii] Roberts, 1996.

[xiv] Woodward, 1995, p. 2.

[xv] Cutts, 1999, p. 2.

[xvi] Harland, 2017, p. 12.

[xvii] Woodward, 1995, p. 12.

[xviii] Cutts, 1999, p. 2.

[xix] Morris, 2004, p. 99.

[xx] Cutts, 1999, p. 2.

[xxi] Barber, 2014, p. 128-143.

[xxii] Cutts, 1999, p. 18.

[xxiii] Harland, 2017, p. 13.

[xxiv] Zürcher, 2007, p. 82.

[xxv] Sagramoso, 2007, p. 692.

[xxvi] Evangelista, 2002, p. 2.

[xxvii] EC factsheet, 2010, Humanitarian Aid for the Victims of the Chechen War.

[xxviii] German, 2007.

[xxix] EU humanitarian factsheet on Chechnya, 2011.

[xxx] Ibid.

[xxxi] Le Huérou, 2014.

[xxxii] HRW, 2000, Human Rights World Report; HRW, 2006, HRW Briefing Paper for the 37^th Session UN Committee against Torture.

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