
Source: Author’s own
Introduction
“The fact of genocide is as old as humanity”, philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre wrote (Sartre, 1971, p. 534). Yet international law only confronted this reality in 1948 with the adoption of the Genocide Convention (United Nations, 1948). In the aftermath of World War II, as the Allies uncovered the full extent of the Holocaust, Winston Churchill declared this a “crime without a name” (Kuper, 1981, p. 12). It was Raphael Lemkin (1944, p. 79) who invented the word genocide; he wrote, “[g]enocide is directed against the national group as an entity, not in their individual capacity, but as members of the national group.” This understanding was later codified in Article II of the Genocide Convention, which defines genocide as the “intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group” (United Nations, 1948).
Since its conception, scholars have debated the Convention’s limited list of protected groups – particularly the exclusion of political groups, which had appeared in early drafts (Schabas, 2009; Schaack, 1997, p. 2261). This omission poses significant challenges for understanding and prosecuting the crimes committed during the Cambodian Genocide (1975-79). Despite the Khmer Rouge’s notorious record, in which roughly a quarter of Cambodia’s population died, only the atrocities against the Cham Muslims and Vietnamese met the Convention’s criteria for genocide (Jackson, 1989; Kiernan, 2003; Midlarsky, 2005; Sanga, 2025). The overwhelming majority of killings, which targeted political opponents, suspected traitors, class enemies, and members of the former state elite, fell outside the Convention’s definition and were therefore prosecuted as crimes against humanity (Sanga, 2025, p. 211; ECCC, 2025b). Both Leblanc (1991) and Sanga (2025, p. 208) claim that this classification lacks the gravity associated with genocide.
This essay first presents an overview of the Cambodian case and explains its relevance as a case study for examining gaps in genocide law. It then reviews the scholarly debate between ‘expansionist’ interpretations, which advocate extending protection to additional groups, and positions that emphasise preserving the Convention’s original framework. The analysis argues that political groups should be understood as falling within the scope of genocide, since the intent to eradicate a political group is functionally indistinguishable from the intent to destroy groups already protected under the Convention. Moreover, the Khmer Rouge frequently characterised political enemies as “Khmer with Vietnamese minds,” collapsing distinctions between political, national, and ethnic identities (Levene 2005, p. 83). This rhetoric demonstrates how ideological persecution can be reframed in ethnonational terms, thereby blurring the boundary that the Convention attempts to maintain between protected and unprotected groups. The Cambodian case thus exposes a fundamental tension within genocide law: when political identity is constructed as a form of national or ethnic betrayal, the legal exclusion of political groups becomes increasingly difficult to sustain, particularly since the intent to destroy such groups is not meaningfully different from the intent directed at groups already protected under the Convention.
Case Overview
In 1975, following the overthrow of Lon Nol’s authoritarian government, the Khmer Rouge seized power, and Pol Pot began implementing his radical vision of a pure agrarian society (Sainati, 2012, p. 162). Within days of taking control, Khmer Rouge soldiers forcibly evacuated Cambodia’s major cities as Pol Pot initiated his revolutionary program, “Year Zero,” which sought to dismantle existing social, political, and economic structures and drive millions of people into the countryside to establish an agrarian communist state (Beachler, 2009, p. 216). In the process, the Khmer Rouge dismantled the foundations of Cambodian society, eliminating money, markets, religion, education, private property, and traditional family structures in an attempt to reshape the country according to their revolutionary ideology (Sainati, 2012, p. 162). The regime pursued what Hannum describes as the racial, social, ideological, and political “purification” of Cambodia, systematically eliminating individuals who did not conform to its vision (Hannum, 1989, p. 85). Ethnic minorities were also targeted as the regime attempted to erase cultural and national distinctions within the state, declaring that Cambodia would consist of only one nation and one language (Becker, p. 253). In addition to ethnic groups, the Khmer Rouge persecuted political, economic, and class groups, portraying perceived opponents as a form of contamination that threatened the revolutionary project. This ideology was reflected in regime propaganda, warning that “what is infected must be cut out” (Chalk & Jonassohn, 1990, p. 404). For example, following an alleged coup attempt in 1976, the Khmer Rouge carried out extensive purges against party leaders, local officials, military officers, and civilians suspected of association with political opposition (Schaack, 1997, p. 2271).
Kiernan (2003, pp. 586-587) estimates that between 1975 and 1979, the death toll ranged from 1.671 to 1.871 million people, accounting for approximately 21-24 percent of Cambodia’s 1975 population. In response to the scale of these atrocities, the new Cambodian government that emerged after the fall of the Khmer Rouge sought international assistance to bring Khmer Rouge leaders to justice. In 1997, Prime Minister Hun Sen formally requested the support of the international community to help establish a mechanism to prosecute those responsible (Secretary-General & Cambodia, 1997). This request ultimately led to the establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), through a joint agreement between the Cambodian government and the United Nations (UN) (ECCC, 2025a).
In Case 002, the ECCC classified only the extermination of the Vietnamese and Cham Muslims as genocide under the Genocide Convention (Sanga, 2025; Sainati, 2012, p. 196; ECCC, 2025b). Consequently, most victims of the Khmer Rouge were legally recognised under crimes against humanity rather than genocide, since many were persecuted for political reasons and did not belong to the protected groups outlined in the Genocide Convention (Beachler, 2009, p. 215). While crimes against humanity remain among the gravest offenses under international law, it is the crime of genocide, which “belongs at the apex of the pyramid” (Schabas, 2009, pp. 10-11). Sanga (2025, p. 214) argues that the disparity between genocide and crimes against humanity can lead to “unequal access to reparations, recognition, and memorialisation.” This has led Cassese (2003) to critique the morality of international criminal law for prioritising certain victims over others. This discrepancy raises a central question of whether the exclusion of political groups from the Genocide Convention reveals a fundamental gap in international law.
The Exclusion of Political Groups in the Genocide Convention
“Many instances of such crimes of genocide have occurred when racial, religious, political, and other groups have been destroyed entirely or in part [emphasis added]” (United Nations General Assembly, 1947, p. 189). This resolution was adopted by the General Assembly at its 55th session, following the Sixth (Legal) Committee’s preparation of a draft resolution condemning the crime of genocide. However, the inclusion of political groups proved highly controversial among state delegates, many of whom argued that political groups should be excluded because they “lacked the necessary homogeneity and stability” (United Nations General Assembly, 1948, p. 6). The Egyptian delegation, for example, warned that the inclusion would be “dangerous” given the “frequent and inevitable changes of political opinion.” (United Nations General Assembly, 1948, p. 7). France similarly expressed reservations, arguing that violence against racial, social, political, or religious groups could be adequately addressed under crimes against humanity, and that establishing a separate category of genocide was therefore unnecessary and potentially politically and legally problematic (Schabas, 2009, p. 63).
Opposition to the inclusion of political groups was particularly forceful from the Soviet Union, whose stance was shaped by Stalin’s purges of political opponents, including the Kulaks (Schaack, 1997, p. 2268). Amid emerging Cold War tensions, the United States acquiesced to this position, with the expectation that the definition could be revisited at a later stage (Schaack, 1997; Schabas, 2009; Sterio, 2017; Dunoff et al, 2002).
More broadly, the Genocide Convention has been critiqued as a largely reactive response to the Holocaust (Sainati, 2012, p. 176; Sterio, 2017). Schaack (1997) argues that the international drafting committee felt a moral obligation to respond to Nazi atrocities, while simultaneously and somewhat naively assuming that such crimes would not recur. As a result, the Convention has been described as a “retrospective condemnation of the Nazi enterprise” rather than a robust legal tool designed to prevent and punish future genocides (Schaack, 1997, p. 2268). Nevertheless, despite these limitations, the Convention has since been applied in landmark prosecutions, most notably Prosecutor v. Krstić (2001) before the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu (1998) before the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.
The scholarly debate surrounding the scope of genocide is highly contested. On one side are expansionist scholars who advocate broadening the definition beyond the limits of the Genocide Convention; on the other are those who emphasise the importance of preserving the Convention’s original framework. Expansionist arguments are exemplified by Chalk and Jonassohn (1990, p. 407), who argue that “[t]he world cannot afford to ignore [ideologically motivated] genocide simply because most of its victims were not selected as members of racial, religious, or ethnic groups.” Similarly, Luban (2006, p. 319) argues that “it is high time to revisit and revise the definition of genocide to bring it into line with moral reality,” and warns that a limited view of genocide can easily become an “excuse of inaction in the face of mass atrocity.” Schaack (1997, p. 2283) has perhaps been among the most vocal scholars calling for reform, arguing that the exclusion of political groups has created an “inconsistent human rights regime,” and challenges the Convention’s rationale that political groups lack sufficient stability, noting that membership in national or religious groups is arguably also “voluntary.” Szpak (2012, pp. 159-161) reinforces this critique by stressing that religion itself is “a matter of individual choice” and therefore advocates for the expansion of protection to include “political groups,” “homosexuals,” and “economic and professional
classes.” Along similar lines, both Schaack (1997) and Greenawalt (1999) argue that the intent to exterminate a political group is fundamentally no different from the intent to destroy any other group protected under the Genocide Convention. More recently, Sanga (2025, p. 208) has advanced this argument by observing that in dictatorial regimes and countries such as Chile, Myanmar, and Ethiopia, “political affiliation often carries the same existential threat as ethnicity or religion.”
On the other side of the debate, several scholars caution against expanding the definition of genocide. Kabatsi (2005) and Schabas (2009) warn that doing so risks diluting the concept’s moral and legal specificity by rendering it overly broad. Kabatsi (2005, p. 399) echoes the Convention’s original rationale, arguing that political groups lack the permanence required for inclusion among protected categories. Accordingly, Uzonyi and Asal (2020), Harff (2003), and Midlarsky (2005) contend that mass political killings are more accurately classified as “politicide,” defined by Midlarsky (2005, p. 8) as the mass murder of state-designated enemies based on political or socioeconomic criteria. From this perspective, the Cambodian case resembles violence perpetrated by other communist regimes, including Stalin’s collectivisation campaigns and Mao’s Great Leap Forward (Midlarsky, 2005, p. 316).
However, Cambodia exposes significant weaknesses in this classification. While many deaths resulted from forced labour, starvation, and overexertion, the Khmer Rouge also deliberately targeted groups protected under the Genocide Convention, including ethnic Vietnamese and Cham Muslims, alongside political elites and perceived class enemies. This overlap complicates attempts to neatly categorise the violence as either genocide or politicide. Moreover, Midlarsky’s proportionality argument — that a smaller percentage of Cambodia’s population was killed compared with other genocides — shifts attention away from genocidal intent, widely regarded as the crime’s defining element. As critics note, privileging certain victim groups while excluding others risks creating an implicit hierarchy of suffering (Cassese, 2003). The problem is compounded by the fact that politicide has no standing in international law, raising doubts about the analytical and legal value of the distinction.
In response, a growing body of scholarship shifts the focus from rigid group categories to the perpetrator’s intent and the processes through which victim groups are constructed. Hinton and Lifton (2005) argue that the Khmer Rouge manufactured social divisions in ways comparable to other recognised genocides, depicting “oppressor classes” and political enemies as diseased elements requiring elimination. Such rhetoric closely parallels Nazi portrayals of Jewish people as vermin and Rwandan propaganda that likened Tutsis to “cockroaches” (Hinton & Lifton, 2005, pp. 284–285). From this perspective, genocide is defined less by the formal status of the victim group than by mechanisms of exclusion, dehumanisation, and planned destruction. As Hinton and Lifton (2005, p. 211) observe, “constructions of belonging and exclusion lie at the center of genocide.” This intent-focused approach aligns with arguments by Schaack (1997) and Greenawalt (1999) that the Convention should prioritise the perpetrator’s purpose to destroy a group rather than the narrow list of protected categories.
In addition, Levene (2005, p. 83) argues that the Khmer Rouge frequently targeted individuals it labelled as “Khmer with Vietnamese minds,” reflecting a broader ideological narrative constructed by the regime. According to Levene (2005, p. 84), Khmer Rouge leaders cultivated “a mythic saga of classical greatness” in which the Cambodian race-nation was portrayed as once pure and authentic, only to have been corrupted by foreign influence. This rhetoric demonstrates a clear conflation between persecution on national and ethnic grounds and ideological persecution, blurring the distinction that the Genocide Convention attempts to draw between protected and unprotected groups.
This blurring is significant when assessing genocidal intent. While the Convention requires intent to destroy a protected group, it adopts a rigid classification of group identity that struggles to accommodate cases like Cambodia, where victims were targeted for perceived political disloyalty that was articulated through ethnic and national narratives rather than formal group membership (Levene 2005; Kiernan, 2008). By contrast, in Prosecutor v. Akayesu, the ICTR adopted a more flexible approach, “that group identity could be based on perception by the perpetrator, rather than on formal or legal categorisation” (Kiernan, 2008, p. 215). The Cambodian case exposes the limitations of the Convention’s framework, as although the Khmer Rouge constructed enemies in ethnicised and national terms, violence against the Khmer population was interpreted as politically motivated and therefore fell outside the Convention’s definition of genocide.
Conclusion
The Cambodian case study demonstrates the fundamental limitations of the Genocide Convention’s narrow definition of protected groups. While scholars like Schabas (2009) and Kabatsi (2005) caution that expanding the Convention risks diluting its moral and legal gravity, this restrictive framework has produced a system that prioritises certain victim groups over others.
This paper’s analysis of the Cambodian atrocities has shown how political groups can be subjected to processes of dehumanisation comparable to those experienced by groups formally recognised under the Convention, such as Jewish people and Tutsis (Hinton & Lifton, 2005). The Khmer Rouge’s ideology of exterminating “Khmer bodies with Vietnamese minds” exposes the shortcomings of the Convention’s rigid classifications, as victims were targeted through a deliberate blurring of political, national, and ethnic categories (Kiernan, 2008, p. 3; Levene, 2005).
If the law is to remain an equitable and effective tool for prevention and accountability, it must acknowledge the reality that politicised groups can suffer persecution comparable in scale, intent, and severity to that inflicted upon protected groups. Notably, early drafts of the Genocide Convention recognised this possibility, but Cold War politics ultimately produced a gap in the law, one that remains unresolved. Addressing this gap is essential if the Convention is to fulfil its foundational purpose in both recognising past atrocities and preventing future ones.

Source: Author’s own
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Beth Coleman
Beth is an MA student in Conflict, Security and Development at King’s College London. Her academic interests focus on genocide studies, state violence, and mass atrocity prevention. She explores the political and structural drivers of violence in fragile and conflict-affected contexts.
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